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Scientific Avoidance: Toward More Principled Judicial
Review of Legislative Science
EMILY HAMMOND MEAZELL*

Courts increasingly confront legislative enactments made in light of scientific
uncertainty. Even so, the degree of deference appropriateto this type ofjudicial
review is a moving target,seemingly determinedon an ad hoc, unprincipledbasis.On
one hand, the decision of how to legislate in light of scientific uncertainty is
quintessentially one of policy, suggesting that the highest degree of deference is
appropriate.But certain classes of cases, and certain types of scientific questions,
seem singularly inappropriatefor extreme judicial deference. While significant
scholarly attentionhasfocused on the comparative institutionalcompetence ofcourts
and legislatureswith respect to substantiveareas of law, analogousconcerns related
to science have been overlooked. This Article attempts to fill part of that gap by
evaluating the courts' and legislatures' capabilitieswith respect to science from a
comparativeperspective. This analysis leads to a critical examination of courts'
traditionaldeference to statutes enacted in light of scientific uncertainty, and to the
conclusion that a moreprincipledframeworkis needed Finally,the Articleproposes
such a framework to account for both positive law and comparative scientific
institutionalcompetence.
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INTRODUCTION

In the push-and-pull dynamic between courts and legislatures, the proposition that
legislatures are better equipped to handle scientific uncertainty is usually taken for
granted. Indeed, the Supreme Court has memorialized this concept with the following
language: "When Congress undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and
scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad and courts should
be cautious not to rewrite legislation."'
Appealing as this "scientific avoidance" principle is, it is based on a number of
assumptions that do not always hold true. Contrary to conventional wisdom, for

* Associate Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law, 2008. The author wishes
to thank Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Paul Heald, Richard A. Nagareda, and Jason M. Solomon for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974); see also Gonzales v. Carhart
(CarhartI), 127 S.Ct. 1610, 1636 (2007) (citing Marshall,414 U.S. at 427 with approval).
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example, there are times when courts are the institutions with the comparative
institutional advantage regarding science. In addition, this principle of deference
assumes a low-level standard of review, so it does not account for how a court should
proceed when the scientific issues are relevant to matters that are subject to a more
searching scrutiny. Furthermore, the principle leaves open a glaring question: how
should a court engage in such review if a legislature actually gets positive science
wrong?
Perhaps because of these unexamined assumptions, the courts' evolving application
of scientific avoidance has resulted in unprincipled exercises in post hoc
rationalization, which suggest that scientific values-rather than those of the legal
system-are in control. This approach puts science on a pedestal over law and
undermines the significant strengths ofthe legal system in implementing social, moral,
and philosophical values. As between courts and legislatures, moreover, it risks a
judicial abdication of constitutional responsibility.
This is not to say that scientific avoidance is never merited. To the contrary, there
are many instances in which legislatures are the better institutions for considering
science; because the legislative branch is politically accountable, there are many
reasons to think that legislatures' policy decisions should be entitled to deference.
Indeed, I use the term "scientific avoidance" purposefully for its potential to reflect
2
considerations analogous to those bearing on the use of constitutional avoidance.
There has been no examination, however, as to when these considerations in favor of
scientific avoidance outweigh the reasons to be cautious.
In this Article, I attempt to fill part of that gap by providing an in-depth analysis of
scientific avoidance. This analysis has a positive component, but it is also deeply
normative because it disentangles scientific competence from the constitutional
analysis. This approach reveals scientific avoidance at its most and least principled,
and suggests a framework for future applications.
To place the issue in concrete terms, consider the following examples. In Jacobson
v. Massachusetts,3 an individual challenged a law making smallpox vaccines
mandatory. The basis of his substantive due process argument was that the legislature
had acted irrationally because there were too many medical risks associated with the
vaccine. In essence, he disagreed with the legislature's science. The U.S. Supreme
Court soundly rejected this contention, upholding the legislature's prerogative to make
reasonable policy decisions in light of scientific uncertainty.
Just over one hundred years later, the Court confronted a challenge to the PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act of 20035 in Gonzales v. Carhart(Carhart 1).6 In support of
the Act, Congress made a number of factual findings, essentially concluding that a
"partial-birth" abortion was never medically necessary.7 But the legislative record
suggested that there was scientific uncertainty whether, in some instances, "partialbirth" abortion might be medically necessary.8 Every district court that had examined

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

For further discussion, see infra Part II.
197 U.S. 11 (1905).
Id. at 30; see also infra text accompanying notes 119-133.
18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
Id. at 1624.
Id. at 1637-38.
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the facts came to the same conclusion: there was not a medical consensus that a
"partial-birth" abortion was never medically necessary. 9 The Court upheld the Act, but
it had considerable difficulty factoring Congress's legislative findings into its analysis.
While it echoed the principle of deference in light of medical or scientific uncertainty,
satisfactorily explained how that deference should apply to the issues before
it never
°
it.1
Jacobsonand Carhart11 are different in many respects. One distinction centers on
the dialogic nature of the legislative-judicial relationship. Specifically, the Court in
CarhartII was confronting a statute that Congress expressly intended as a response to
an earlier case striking down a partial-birth abortion ban," I while the Jacobsonstatute
had no such history. Although any legislative response must comply with constitutional
restraints, it seems possible that such statutes might carry at least some additional gloss
of constitutionality.12 Even so, CarhartI1did not link its use of scientific avoidance to
the historical facts surrounding the statute's passage.
A second distinction involves the nature of the rights at issue; historically, courts
have reviewed health-and-safety laws of the Jacobson sort very deferentially, while
abortion jurisprudence has involved a more searching approach. 13 On a related note,
the general tiered system of review that is utilized in equal protection and substantive
due process analyses typically varies the level of scrutiny according to whether a
statute has targeted a suspect class or a fundamental right. 14 This scheme is supported
by a number of normative justifications, one of which is the comparative legitimacy of
the elected, representative branch and the countermajoritarian role of the judicial
branch.' 5 Yet the Court in CarhartII never explained why scientific avoidance-at
heart a principle of deference-should be justified even in a heightened-review setting.

9. Id. at 1638.
10. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 237-258.
11. See Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart1), 530 U.S. 914, 921-22 (2000) (striking down
Nebraska's partial-birth abortion ban); see also infra text accompanying notes 220-258
(analyzing CarhartI and Carhartfl).
12. For examples of the types of cases where this practice might legitimately apply, see Dan
T. Coenen, StructuralReview, Pseudo-Second-LookDecisionMaking, andthe Risk ofDiluting
ConstitutionalLiberty, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1881, 1883-84 (2001) (describing statutes
upheld following constitutional "remands").
13. Compare, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391 (1926)
(rational relation to "health and safety"), with Carhart 11, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1640 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("close scrutiny").
14. Compare, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to a gender-based classification), and Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968)
(applying strict scrutiny to a ballot-access provision), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1967) (applying strict scrutiny to a race-based classification), with Williamson v. Lee Optical,
348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (applying rational basis review to an economic regulation).
15. See generallyALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME

(2d ed. 1986) (arguing that courts must apply neutral decisionmaking principles rather than merely decide matters of legislative policy); JOHN H. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (arguing for representation-reinforcing judicial review that
facilitates representation of minorities). For classic critiques of the tiered system, see generally
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword:In Search ofEvolving Doctrineon
a Changing Court:A Modelfor Newer Equal Protection,86 HARv. L. REv. 1(1972), describing
COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLIICS
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The purpose of this Article is not to quibble with the tiered system of review, or
even to attempt to argue with how those standards have been applied in any particular
cases. This Article takes that system, as well as the view that courts ought to avoid
constitutional confrontations with legislatures where possible, as given. But it contends
that these principles offer only one piece of the puzzle for scientific avoidance because
they do not evaluate analogous concerns for science. The missing piece, for
understanding Jacobson and CarhartII and applying scientific avoidance generally, is
the comparative institutional competence of legislatures and courts with respect to
science, yet that consideration has been systemically overlooked. The result is at best
an incomplete understanding from which to inform judicial review of statutes. The
potential consequences, however, implicate much broader concerns.
First, accuracy in decision making is closely tied to perceptions of fairness and
legitimacy. With society's faith in science comes an inherent belief that scientific
"truth" is inextricably linked to fairness. A result contrary to science, therefore, seems
fundamentally unfair. Judicial review of statutes should seek to maximize scientific
accuracy in both branches; failure to do so undermines the legal system's values of
fairness and legitimacy.
Relatedly, there is a tendency in both legislatures and courts to assume that science
is a panacea, particularly at law-science intersections where science is uncertain. For
example, when courts are presented with unanswered, or unanswerable, scientific
questions, there is a profound temptation to try to answer those questions, based on the
mistaken belief that the scientific answer will provide the legal answer. 16 Legislatures
are likewise tempted to assume that science will dictate policy. 17 In both institutions,
there lies the assumption that resolving the science will resolve the issue. This
dangerous assumption fails to recognize the legal values that so strongly contribute to
society's way of living with, and responding to, uncertainty.
In this Article, I develop an analytical approach that incorporates the considerations
of comparative scientific competence that have been missing in statutory review. This
framework is intended to complement modern norms of statutory review while
accounting for: (1) the competing values of the scientific and legal systems, and (2) the
comparative abilities of courts and legislatures to incorporate "good science" into their
decision making. Just as courts and legislatures differ in their strengths vis-t-vis
substantive law, so too do they differ when one closely examines the types of scientific
questions at issue in any given matter.
Part II of this Article establishes the context from which to start thinking about
scientific avoidance. It begins by briefly examining the nature of science, with a
particular focus on scientific uncertainty, the development of scientific consensus, and
the tiered approach and arguing for rational basis review with "bite," and Hans A. Linde, Due
Processof Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197 (1976), critiquing rationality review.
16. See Sheila Jasanoff, Just Evidence: The Limits of Science in the LegalProcess,34 J.L.
MED. & ETHIcs 328, 328 (2006) (criticizing "modem societies' conviction that science can
deliver fail-safe, and therefore just, legal outcomes where the law, acting on its own, might fall
short"); Howard T. Markey, Jurisprudenceor "Juriscience"?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 525,
529-30 (1984) (cautioning against judicial overreliance on science).
17. See generally Wendy E. Wagner, Congress,Science, andEnvironmentalPolicy, 1999
U. ILL. L. REv. 181 (arguing that Congress overrelies on science and shifts the costs of that
overreliance to administrative agencies).
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competing scientific and legal values. The discussion then turns to an evaluation of
science in both relevant legal institutions: the courts and the legislatures. The courts
have endured particular criticisms related to science, but this Part reveals that courts at
times have comparative advantages over legislatures when confronted with scientific
issues. Even so, other contexts reveal a distinct comparative advantage for legislatures.
Thus, an assessment of where the comparative advantage lies in a particular case is a
critical part of the scientific avoidance framework.
Part III turns to the legal context within which scientific avoidance has developed.
As we shall see, the concept ofjudicial deference to legislatures in light of uncertain
science originated in review of statutes like that in Jacobson,which were directed at
the general health, safety, and welfare. Later, this deference was extended to cases
implicating stronger liberty interests, as happened in CarhartII. With this extension
came a tendency to use scientific avoidance as a post-hoc rationalization rather than a
guiding principle or doctrine. Thus, I develop a typology for scientific avoidance cases
that informs my proposed new framework. This framework accounts for both the
substantive legal issue and the particular scientific issue in a way that seeks to
maximize the relative institutional capabilities of courts and legislatures. I show how
the historical scientific avoidance cases can be understood according to this
framework, and I suggest future applications and potential avenues for extension. Part
IV concludes that scientific avoidance promises another step toward the ongoing
search for synergy in law and science.
I. AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON LAW AND SCIENCE

Before beginning an analysis of scientific avoidance, it is constructive to examine
how scientific values differ from those of the legal system. Conflicts between science
and law can be understood as problems of competing values, and to the extent
scientific avoidance serves those differing values, it may help ease some of that
conflict. But the analysis should not be confined to general observations about
scientific values as opposed to legal-system values. Although that is the starting point,
this Part's final component evaluates the judicial and legislative branches' comparative
capabilities with respect to internalizing scientific values. This particularized analysis
facilitates interpreting past scientific avoidance cases and developing a framework for
more principled future applications.
A. The Nature of Uncertain Science
1. Scientific Method
One of the most difficult challenges of incorporating science into legal decisions
lies in science's propensity to stay in motion. Legal systems do-and must, if they are
to bring fairness and finality to disputes-try to capture "good" science. But scientific
certainty as it relates to the law travels along a continuum. The doctrine of judicial
notice, for example, relies on science at its most certain to preclude the need for proof
of "things which must happen according to the laws of nature,' I8 and some science,

18. Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37,42 (1875); see FED. R. EviD. 201(b) (describing kinds of
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while not certain enough for judicial notice, may still be sufficiently settled that it is not
ordinarily considered problematic to ask a fact finder to consider it or rely on it when
considering questions of fact.' 9 This is the area where outcomes that conflict with
science are most obvious. But the far more perplexing other end of the continuum-that of unresolved (and perhaps unresolvable) scientific uncertainty-places scientific
and legal-system values in greatest tension. A brief look at the nature of science shows
why this is so.
Whatever its place on the continuum of certainty, science is widely understood to be
a methodology; the "scientific method" involves making observations, devising and
empirically testing hypotheses to explain those observations, and revising or
abandoning those hypotheses in a continual process. 20 The longer a hypothesis holds
up to this process, the more acceptance it gains in the scientific community, such that it
might rise to the status of scientific theory.2' Even so, "scientific truth" is something of
a fiction: "Although [science's] goal is to approach true explanations as closely as
possible, its investigators claim no final or permanent explanatory
truths. Science
22
changes. It evolves. Verifiable facts always take precedence."

facts that may be judicially noticed); Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592
n.1 1(1993) ("[T]heories that are so firmly established as to have attained the status of scientific
law, such as thermodynamics, properly are subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of
Evidence 201."); see also Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F.3d 211, 214 (11th Cir. 1997) (providing
examples of matters ordinarily within judicial notice, including "scientific facts, such as when
the sun rises or sets"); Fowler v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 321 F.2d 566, 570 (6th Cir. 1963) ("[I]f
electrical power line is grounded by [the] conductor, current will flow through the conductor.");
Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (noting that the distance
and force of recoil of elastic are proportional to the amount of tension placed upon it);
Application of Gruskin, 234 F.2d 493, 498 (C.C.P.A. 1956) (basic properties of calcium
carbonate); Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 427 F. Supp. 1204, 1205 (W.D.
Wis. 1977) (taking judicial notice that consuming food results inheat measured as calories). For
a criticism of the current rules for judicial notice as applied to science and technology, see
generally Christopher Onstott, JudicialNotice and the Law's "Scientific" Searchfor Truth, 40
AKRON L. REv. 465 (2007).

19. To name but one example, courts routinely admit DNA evidence, even though such
evidence is not foolproof. See generallyThomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Admissibility ofDNA
Identification Evidence, 84 A.L.R. 4TH 313 (1991 & Supp. 2008) (collecting cases and
describing criticisms). On the other hand, there is little scholarship assessing the appropriateness
of judicial reliance on scientific information when deciding matters of law. For a notable
exception, see generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LABORATORY OF JUSTICE (2004) (providing detailed

account of empirical assumptions underpinning constitutional doctrine).
20. See FAIGMAN, supra note 19, at 120-21; NAT'L ACADEMIES PRESS, RESPONSIBLE
SCIENCE VOLUME I: ENSURING THE INTEGRITY OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS 38 (1992) [hereinafter
RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE]; cf THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 36-

42, 52 (3d ed. 1996) (describing normal science as puzzle-solving, cumulative exercise that
ultimately leads to paradigm shifts). But see SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE-WTHIN
REASON 23 (2007) (arguing science is not epistemologically privileged because these are
standards by which we judge "all inquirers, detectives, historians, investigative journalists, etc.,
as well as scientists") (emphasis in original).
21. See KUHN, supra note 20, at 166 ("In its normal state.., a scientific community is an
immensely efficient instrument for solving the problems or puzzles that its paradigms define.").
22. RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE, supra note 20.
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"Verifiable facts" should be distinguished from hypotheses and theories; this
distinction will later provide an important key to unlocking the comparative strengths
of courts versus legislatures. A scientific fact is simply an observation or measurement
of a natural or experimental phenomenon. 23 Thus, once a scientific fact is established,
it makes sense that the fact could be the proper object ofjudicial notice, for example,
because the observation itself is usually less likely to be a contested issue. For the same
reason, legislatures relying on scientific facts as implicit assumptions underlying
statutes are unlikely to face challenges to those statutes on scientific grounds.
By contrast, hypotheses offer proposed explanations of those facts, and tend to be
much more controversial. Theories are hypotheses that have gained acceptance because
their predictions have survived rigorous testing; but even familiar theories, such as the
theory of gravity, have grey edges of uncertainty. 24 It is accurate, then, to say that
science is never certain. But ifthat is true, how does scientific consensus ever emerge?
And when is there enough agreement to say that there is a consensus at all? That topic
is broad enough to merit volumes of scholarly assessment, but for our purposes the
following contours are useful.25
2. Consensus Development and Uncertainty
Though science values a constant of change, there are certain enduring principles by
which scientific validity is measured in the scientific community itself.26 Foremost is a
basic adherence to the scientific method described in the preceding Part. In addition,
two particular attributes are frequently mentioned as supporting scientific validity and
are therefore worth special mention: testability and falsifiability. The first, testability,
was considered in detail by Carl G. Hempel, who wrote extensively about the logical
relationship between observations and theories.27 In his work the Philosophy of

23. Id.
24. KUnN, supra note 20, at 149 (describing difficulty of reconciling Newtonian physics
and its concomitant paradigm of space, with Einstein's general theory of relativity, which
introduced the concept of curved space).
25. Any search for the ultimate definition of science is better left to its philosophers, and in
any event, is unnecessary for purposes of this Article. Cf HAACK, supra note 20, at 21
(commenting that many scientists regard philosophy of science as irrelevant--"about as useful
to scientists as ornithology is to birds") (internal quotation and citation omitted).
26. Barry P. McDonald, Government Regulation or Other "Abridgments" of Scientific
Research: The ProperScope of JudicialReview Under the FirstAmendment, 54 EMORY L.J.

979, 1003 (2005); see also id. at 988 ("[M]ost contemporary experts appear to define science...
by the adherence to a certain process or method of deriving knowledge."). Indeed, the Daubert
standard attempts to capture many of those principles. See Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993) (setting forth a nonexclusive list of factors for reliability
including testability, peer review and publication, the known or potential rate of error, and
general acceptance).
27. Hempel was a philosopher of the logical positivism movement, which was "best known
for its efforts to eliminate ideological and metaphysical influences from science and culture, and
to develop rigorous standards, based on logic, of scientific validity." KENNETH R. FOSTER &
PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: ScIENTIFc KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 41
(1997). Professors Foster and Huber note that positivism is so "out of intellectual fashion that

sociologists of science now use 'positivist' as a loose epithet." Id. at 48. Nevertheless, testability
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Natural Science, Hempel argued that scientific explanations must meet two
requirements.25 The first, explanatory relevance, requires that an explanation must
afford "good grounds for believing that the phenomenon to be explained did, or does,
indeed occur.",29 The second requirement is that of testability: some empirical finding
must support or contradict the explanation.
Closely related to testability is the more controversial validating attribute,
falsiflability. Described by Karl Popper as a way to distinguish science from pseudoscience in his work Conjectures andRefutations, falsifiability requires that scientific
hypotheses must be refutable.30 Consider, for example, Intelligent Design (ID) in
contrast to evolution as a scientific theory for the diversity of species.3' Proponents of
ID contend that "certain features of the universe and of living things are best explained
by an intelligent cause, not an undirected process such as natural selection." 32 The
difficulty from a scientific perspective, however, is that there is currently no way to
prove this statement wrong.3 3 Moreover, it is vulnerable to "confirmation bias"; that is,
nearly any scientific roadblock can be explained away as being attributable to an
intelligent creator. 34 Evolutionary theory, on the other hand, is the subject of constant
revision as scientists test hypotheses and find some of them false. 35 Indeed, the
remains in fashion as a defining mark of good science. See, e.g., Daubert,509 U.S. at 593.
28. CARL G. HEMPEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 48 (1966).
29. Id.
30. KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: TaE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC

KNOWLEDGE 44, 47-48 (Routledge 2002) (1962).
3 1. For an extended discussion about this topic, see Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist.,
400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 735-46 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (concluding ID is "an interesting theological
argument, but that it is not science").
32. Discovery Institute, What is Intelligent Design?, http://www.intelligentdesign.org/
whatisid.php.
33. Indeed, ID's inability to be falsified undergirds the scientific community's failure to
accept it as a legitimate scientific theory. See American Association for the Advancement of
Science, American Association for the Advancement of Science Board Resolution on Intelligent

Design Theory, http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2002/1106id2.shtml (relying in part on ID
proponents' inability to propose a scientific means of testing their claims in rejecting ID as a
scientific theory for the diversity of species). Note that falsiflability can be understood as a
species of testability; Popper contended that genuine tests of theories are attempts to falsify
them. POPPER, supranote 30, at 48 ("Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or
to refute it."); see FOSTER &HUBER, supra note 27, at 235 (1999) (describing testability as a

"signpost on the road that leads to Frye. Scientific views that are formulated in terms concrete

enough to be falsified if in fact they are wrong are views that are likely to become 'generally
accepted' over time if in fact they are correct.").
34. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 742 ("ID is reliant upon forces acting outside of the
natural world, forces that we cannot see, replicate, control or test"); FOSTER & HUBER, supra
note 27, at 44-46 (describing confirmation bias as the phenomenon of looking for data to
confirm a theory, rather than discredit it).
35. See, e.g., Richard A. Kerr, Did Darwin Get It All Right?, 267 Sci. 1421, 1421 (1995)
(describing research suggesting punctuated equilibrium is the dominant mode of speciation,
rather than Darwin's gradualism); see also John Rennie, 15 Answers to CreationistNonsense,
at
at
78,
available
AM.,
July
2002,
SCI.
http://www.sciam.com/article.cfin?articlelD=OOOD4FEC-7D5B- 1 D078E49809EC588EEDF
&pageNumber=-2&catID=2 (describing testability of evolution and debates amongst
evolutionary biologists).
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impressive thing about falsifiable theories is that there is a risk in making predictionsthe risk that they may be refuted.36
To be sure, some theories are more testable than others, and falsifiability can be a
difficult criterion to actually apply.37 Numerous scholars have harshly criticized
Popper's reliance on falsifiability; 38 nevertheless, that trait remains as a tool from
which to assess adherence to scientific values. 39 And indeed, regardless of one's
particular philosophy of science, it is worth emphasizing that the scientific community
manages to implement its values in such a way as to reach accord over time. Even
Thomas Kuhn, who wrote the influential Structure of Scientific Revolutions with its
description of paradigm shifts, emphasized the remarkable ability' 4°of the scientific
community to "reach a firm consensus unattainable in other fields. ,
As I have described it thus far, scientific methodology contributes to consensus
development in an informal manner, with few rigid rules or required structures. It
unfolds on its own timeframe as scientists publish, present, or otherwise communicate
their findings and subsequent studies build on or refute that work. But throughout the
history of science, there have been attempts to formalize the consensus development
process. Here, I offer two modem examples that shed further light on scientific values
and methodology. Later, they help characterize the comparative institutional
advantages of legislatures and the courts.
First, consider the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), established
in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations
Environment Programme. IPCC's purpose is to evaluate the state of science relevant to
understanding human-induced climate change. 41 The IPCC does not conduct any
research, but instead assesses the latest scientific and technical information for the
purpose of providing reports on the state of knowledge on climate change.42 Utilizing
strict procedures, draft reports are prepared by teams of expert authors and undergo a
two-stage review involving experts as well as governments.43 The resulting product is

36. See POPPER, supra note 30, at 47.
37. See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 27, at 46-48 (describing critiques of Popper's views).
38. Id.at 47-48 (collecting criticisms of Popper's criteria).
39. See Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (citing with
approval KARL M. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989)). The concept of falsifiability is not limited to the evidentiary
context of the Daubert test. See McLean v. Ark. Rd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1267 (E.D.
Ark. 1982) (including falsifiability in list of essential characteristics of science and concluding
creationism is not science); FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 27, at 53-54 (considering whether
creation science is falsifiable and describing criticism of McLean list); see also STEVEN
GOLDBERG, CULTURE CLASH 10 (1994) (describing various schools of science philosophy and
concluding that regardless of philosophical view of science, scientific community "is remarkably
adept at defining itself and at adjudicating what is and is not good science from its own
professional perspective").
40. KUHN,supranote 20, at 173.

41. IPCC, About IPCC, http://www.ipcc.ch/about/index.htm.
42. IPCC, IPCC Reports, http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/index.htm.
43. IPCC, 16 YEARS OF ScIENTIC AssEssMENr iN SUPPORT OF THE CLIMATE CONVENTION 4
(2004), availableat http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/l Oth-anniversary/anniversary-brochure.pdf.
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intended to be the policy-neutral result ofan open, broad-based and transparent process
of high scientific standards. 44
A second example is the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Consensus
Development Program (CDP), whose purpose is to evaluate the state of science on
biomedical issues and compose a statement addressing specific questions. 4 Like the
ICPP methodology, the CDP does not involve independent scientific research. The
process begins with selection of a broad-based, independent panel to which experts
present data; the panel then conducts a systematic literature review on selected
biomedical issues. The panel prepares a draft statement, which is open for comment
and usually finalized a month or two later.46 The statement may reflect uncertainties,
options, or minority viewpoints,
and it is meant to advance understanding rather than
47
further any particular policy.

Although the scientific community can utilize both formal and informal methods of
developing consensus, a consensus does not always emerge.4 s This may be at least
partly attributable to the perception that a particular consensus would lead to particular
policy choices, but it also reflects the unavoidable reality that traditional scientific
methodologies cannot always answer scientific questions. This reality was captured by
scientist Alvin M. Weinberg when he coined his famous term "trans-science." 49 Transscientific questions are those which, while capable of being posed in scientific
terminology, "are unanswerable by science; they transcend science." 50 An example

44. IPCC, supra note 41. The global warming debate has been the target of informal
consensus development as well. See COMM'N ON THE SCI. OF CLIMATECHANGE,NAT'LACAD. OF
SciS., CLIMATE CHANGE ScIENcE: AN ANALYsIS OF SOME KEY QuEsTIONS 3 (2001) ("The IPCC's
conclusion that most of the observed warming of the last 50 years is likely to have been due to
the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations accurately reflects the current thinking of the
scientific community on this issue."); Naomi Oreskes, Beyond the Ivory Tower: The Scientific
Consensus on Climate Change,306 Sci. 1686,1686 (2004) (describing review of peer-reviewed
scientific journals for dissenting opinions, and finding lack thereof).
45. NIH,
NIH
Consensus
Development
Program,
http://consensus.nih.gov/ABOUTCDP.htm.
46. Id.
47. Id.

48. See Donald Ludwig, Ray Hilbom & Carl J. Walters, Uncertainty, Resource
Exploitation,and Conservation:Lessons from History, 260 ScI. 17, 17 (1993) ("We propose

that we shall never attain scientific consensus concerning the [fisheries] systems that are being
exploited"). Indeed, NIH has an analogue to the Consensus Development Conference: a Stateof-the-Science Conference, which summarizes evidence and recommends directions for further
research. NIH, supra note 45.
49. See generallyAlvin M. Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERvA 209 (1972).
This conceptualization has received little attention in the legal commentary, with a notable
exception being Professor Wagner's Note, which suggests a burden-shifting approach in
scientifically uncertain toxic torts cases. Wendy E. Wagner, Note, Trans-Science in Torts, 96
YALE L.J. 428 (1986).
50. Weinberg, supra note 49, at 209; see also Alvin M. Weinberg, Originsof Science and
Trans-Science, CrrATION CLAssIcs,
Aug. 26, 1991, at 18, available at
http://garfield.library.upenn.edu/classicsl991/A1991GA09900001.pdf; Alvin M. Weinberg,
Editorial, Science and Trans-Science, 177 Sci. 211 (1972).
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trans-scientific question concerns the effects of low-level toxic exposure.5 Measuring
any kind of very low-level environmental exposure would require a protocol, or sample
size, so large as to render the experiment practically impossible. 2 Moreover, even ifno
effect were observed during such an experiment, one could say there was no link only
in probabilistic terms.5 3
Trans-science provides a useful end-of-the-spectrum in this discussion of the nature
of science, as well as an introduction to the next Part. Whereas "positive science," or
observable facts, might undergird statutes or be the subject ofjudicial notice without
cause for concern, as uncertainty increases, institutional choices should be closely
examined. This is because-as discussed in the next Part-policy considerations must
take an increasingly important role in decision making. Indeed, at the trans-scientific
level, decision making is nearly completely policy-driven in the sense that there is only
a lack of science from which courts or legislatures can inform their choices. In between
scientific facts and trans-science are the uncertainties that confront courts and
legislatures daily-many examples of which form the basis for the cases presented in
Part III.A. For now, this overview of the scientific method, consensus development,
and the nature of uncertainty provides a basis for identifying key differences between
science and law as institutions.
3. Comparing Values
This brief description of science should make apparent at least three points. First,
scientific and legal systems embrace different values. Even though philosophies of
science may differ, most people agree upon several intrinsic scientific values. Those
include such things as empiricism, independence, skepticism, and progress. 4
Testability, for example, generally requires empirical analysis, and results are often
stated in probabilistic terms.55 Likewise, falsifiability relates to the values of skepticism
and independence because it requires attention to ways that theories could be proven
wrong. Finally, the scientific method, with its constant revisions and refining,
represents continual progress and the search for new knowledge. Trans-science, too,
relates to these values; unanswered questions are ripe for creative new approaches, and

51. See Weinberg, supra note 49, at 210. Weinberg wrote in particular of the transscientific questions surrounding the biological effects of low-level radiation exposure. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. Similarly, the extent and locations of future global temperature changes pose transscientific issues. See Carol L. Silva & Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, The PrecautionaryPrinciplein
Context: U.S. andE. U.Scientists ' PrescriptionsforPolicy in the Face of Uncertainty,88 Soc.
Sci. Q.640, 642 (2007) (describing uncertainties involving global climate change).
54. See NAT'L AcAD. OF Scis., NAT'L AcAD. OF ENG'G & INST. OF MED., ON BEING A
SCIEImST: RESPONSIBLE CoNDucT IN RESEARCH 1-2 (2d ed. 1995) (describing attributes of
scientific research).
55. See Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and StatisticalLinks: The Role ofScientific
Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 469, 482 (1988)
(explaining that scientific hypotheses are often expressed as probabilities); see also Lee
Loevinger, Standards of Proof in Science and Law, 32 JURIMETRCS J. 323, 333 (1992)
("[S]cientific standards of proof are expressed numerically, stating degrees of probability or
confidence, while legal standards of proof are categorical and are expressed entirely in verbal
terms.").
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the questions
that seem unanswerable today may be the topic of tomorrow's hot new
56
research.

Legal-system values tend to be of a different character, encompassing such ideals as
fairness, justice, finality, and predictability. 57 Thus, "[t]he law is rarely concerned
solely with factual truth in the scientific sense because that is rarely society's sole
concern." 58 And as Justice Stephen Breyer argues, "a court proceeding, such as a trial,
is not simply a search for dispassionate truth. The law must be fair."59 But this
difference in values leads to my second point: if science always encompasses some
quantum of uncertainty, there will always be a policy gap for our legal institutions to
fill. This will happen regardless of whether the relevant institution is a court or a
legislature. For example, pre-injury toxic exposure claims are often squarely in the
trans-scientific realm. By refusing to hold such injuries actionable, courts implement
tort law policy that rejects speculative harm or the threat of future harm as a
compensable injury. 60 Declining to recognize a cognizable injury serves as a funneling
measure, placing the risk of loss on plaintiffs, and essentially reflecting a societal value

56. Even Weinberg conceded that an issue appearing to be trans-scientific may later be
resolvable by more sophisticated science. See Alvin M. Weinberg, Letters, 180 Sd. 1122, 1123
(1973) (stating that the question may be "whether the enormous effort required for such studies
is an appropriate allocation of resources").
57. Perhaps as a corollary, it is also frequently observed that science is rapidly changing,
while law is a more plodding institution. FAiGMAN, supranote 19, at 8.But see Peter H. Schuck,
Multi-CulturalismRedux: Science, Law, and Politics, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 25 (1993)
("The law is usually in much more of a hurry to decide than science is."). Even so, law can and
does change, and the constant testing and revising inherent in the common-law system must
certainly have analogies in the scientific method. Cf GOLDBERG, supra note 39, at 14 ("The law
does gradually change ....

But the process is slow, uncertain, and controversial; there is

nothing in the legal community like the consensus in the scientific community on whether a
particular result constitutes progress."). Further, at their best, both systems share many values,
including intellectual honesty and creativity.
58. GOLDBERG, supranote 39, at 16; Id. at 18 ("[O]ur legal system stresses the process by
which a decision is reached in an attempt to ensure that the decision will be, at the very least,
something society can accept."); see also Joile A. Moreno, Beyond the PolemicAgainst Junk
Science: Navigating the Oceans that Divide Science and Law with JusticeBreyer at the Helm,

81 B.U. L. REv. 1033, 1091 (2001) ("Those trained as advocates must recognize that scientific
validity is independent of our legal goals."); Markey, supranote 16, at 528 ("In cases where the
law is clear and unchallenged, decisions appropriately may turn on a scientific fact. Such cases
must be distinguished, however, from those in which the law, rather than scientific fact, must
control.") (citation omitted).
59. Justice Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science andLaw, 280 Scl. 537, 538
(1998); see also Harold P. Green, The Law-Science Interface in PublicPolicy Decisionmaking,
51 OHIO ST. L.J. 375, 388 (1990) ("The law, on the other hand, is more concerned with the

optimal resolution of disputes than it is with achieving 'correct' decisions that accord with
objective truth. Although the law aspires to decide issues correctly, it is also concerned with
reaching decisions that will be acceptable to the public."); Jasanoff, supranote 16, at 329 ("The
law has its own institutional needs and constraints, and these are broadly geared toward ensuring
that justice is done in each individual case.").
60. See PROSSER & KEETON
ed. 1984).

ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30

(William L. Prosser et al. eds., 5th
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in compensating only a certain definable class of injuries. 61 Likewise, legislatures are
constantly deciding how best to act, as a policy matter, given scientific uncertainty.
Recent debates in the U.S.62 Senate as to how to respond to global climate change
provide a salient example.
These observations lead to the third and most crucial point: it should never be
assumed that finding a scientific "answer" will dictate a policy decision. This trap is in
some ways understandable, because society puts such faith in science. But it is a
misuse of science and a barrier to transparent, well-reasoned decision making. As
former Federal Circuit Chief Judge Howard T. Markey put it, a failure to distinguish
between science and policy "would allow moral, philosophical, and political decisions
to be based solely on the outcome of a purely technical debate between scientific
experts." 63 In our legal institutions, science should inform the law, but should not be
put on a pedestal over it. 64

61. See Schweitzer v. Consol. Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1985) ("We believe,
however, that subclinical injury resulting from exposure to asbestos is insufficient to constitute
the actual loss or damage to a plaintiff's interest required to sustain a cause of action under
generally applicable principles of tort law."); Parker v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d
1355 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (declining to recognize beryllium sensitization as actionable tort injury);
Boyd v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 381 S.E.2d 295, 297 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989), overruled on other
grounds by Hanna v. McWilliams, 446 S.E.2d 741 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting claims for
pesticide exposure where plaintiffs exhibited metabolites but showed no actual disease); see also
O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 804 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
("Recognition of a constitutional right plainly cannot rest on such an inconclusive body of
research and opinion.").
62. See generally David M. Herszenhom, After Verbal Fire, Senate Effectively Kills
ClimateChange Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,2008, at A12; John M. Broder, Senate Opens Debate
on PoliticallyRisky Bill Addressing Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2008, at Al 6.

63. Markey, supra note 16, at 530; see also Sheila Jasanoff& Dorothy W. Nelkin, Science,
Technology, and the Limits of Judicial Competence, 214 SCI. 1211, 1213 (1981) ("[T]he

element of technical and scientific uncertainty often seems to encourage litigants to translate
questions of social value into a technical discourse."). Scholars of administrative law have also
lodged this criticism convincingly. "When scientific data are limited and legislative value
judgments have been made only at the broadest level, political choices necessarily, and
legitimately, factor into natural resource decisions. The core of the problem is not the
involvement of politics but its concealment behind a cloak of science." Holly D. Doremus,
Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource Management in the Bush Administration, 32

ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 253 (2005). Professor Doremus's piece studies the handling of science
against the political administrative backdrop. She illustrates that, as in judicial decision making,
administrative approaches that emphasize transparency and learning may be more normatively
defensible and politically effective over time. Id.
64. See DAvID L. FAIGMAN, DONALD H. KAYE, MICHAEL J. SAKS & JOSEPH SANDERS,
SCIENCE IN THE LAW: STANDARDS, STATISTICS, AND RESEARCH ISSUES 116 (2002) ("God does not
whisper the answers into the ears of scientists, as though they were members of a modem
priesthood."); David S. Caudill & Lewis H. LaRue, Why Judges Applying the DaubertTrilogy
Need to Know About the Social, Institutional, and Rhetorical-And Not Just the
Methodological-Aspects of Science, 45 B.C. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (2003) (arguing that legal

scholarship regarding Daubertoften idealizes science at the expense of social, institutional, and
rhetorical aspects of science); Jasanoff & Nelkin, supra note 63, at 1215 ("The belief that
scientific expertise is inherently removed from value considerations and that scientists are

INDIANA LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 84:239

Rather than elevate science over law in this manner, the goal should be to maximize
the quality of scientific information so that informed policy decisions can be made. By
examining the relative capabilities of courts and legislatures with respect to
maximizing scientific quality, therefore, we can develop the foundation for a principled
application of scientific avoidance. 65 This Part next briefly assesses how science fares
in each institution.
B. Science in the Courts

Justice Breyer has asserted that courts should "aim for decisions that, roughly
speaking, approximately reflect the scientific 'state of the art.' ' 6 Courts struggle to
reach this ideal, as numerous scholars have documented.67 In addition to concerns
about "junk science," the scholarship emphasizes that the adversarial model in general
prevents a full consideration of scientific issues, and most lawyers and judges lack
scientific or technical training. In essence, these concerns speak to the courts' limited
ability to deal with scientific uncertainty.
When one combines these considerations with the fact that legislatures are the
politically accountable institutions, one might be tempted to say that courts should
always attempt to avoid science. But that approach would fail to account for the courts'
constitutional role and would also ignore the contexts in which courts are equipped to
therefore political celibates is an anachronistic and even dangerous one."); Irving M. Klotz, Sci.
AM., May 1980, at 168, 168 ("Science, like any other area of human endeavor, has had its grand
illusions."). But cf McDonald, supra note 26, at 989 ("It is this emphasis on the empirical
reliability and objectivity of scientific knowledge, or the establishment offacts or truths thought
to be 'universal' in nature ...

that impel many to make the claim that science produces

knowledge that is epistemically superior to more 'subjective' forms of knowledge.").
65. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (1994) (describing
considerations of institutional choice amongst imperfect institutions).

66. Justice Stephen J. Breyer, Speech at the Association for the Advancement of Science
Annual Meeting and Science Innovation Exposition: The Interdependence of Science and Law
(Feb.
16,
1998), available at http://instructl.cit.comell.edu/Courses/comm352fall2000/Labs/breyerspeech.html.
67. See generallyPETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
(1991). One prominent example is Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 742 (11th Cir.
1986), which upheld a district court's credibility-based determination that spermicidal jelly
caused birth defects, even though scientific consensus indicated otherwise. See FederalJudges
vs. Science, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 27, 1986, § 1, at 22 (calling Wells "an intellectual
embarrassment"); see also HUBER, supra,at 174 (stating that authors supporting plaintiffs later
repudiated their work); William M. Brown, Djei Vu All over Again: The Exodus from
ContraceptivesResearch and How to Reverse It, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 1, 28 (2001) ("The case is
renowned for [the judge's] complete lack of reasoning or analysis of the scientific evidence.
Specifically, [the judge] reportedly decided the case based on his evaluation of the
trustworthiness of the expert witnesses, rather than their science."). But see Joseph L.
Gastworth, The Needfor Careful EvaluationofEpidemiologicalEvidence in ProductLiability
Cases: A Reexamination of Wells v. Ortho andKey Pharmaceuticals, 2 LAW, PROBABILTY &
RISK 151, 153 (2003) ("While some authors have strongly criticized the Wells decision, this
review suggests that both the trial and appellate judges involved did the best they could with the
information available to them."); Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo 's Retort: Peter Huber'sJunk
Scholarship,42 AM. L. REv. 1637, 1668-70 (1993) (emphasizing that not all authors of Wells
plaintiffs' studies repudiated their work, a fact which Huber did not disclose).
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handle science at least as well as the legislatures. So, although I begin this Part with a
discussion of courts' challenges, I end by suggesting circumstances in which courts'
institutional competence is not necessarily weaker than that of legislatures.
Courts have struggled to find ways of maximizing the quality of science before them
while staying true to legal-system values. This goal is particularly difficult to achieve
when the necessary scientific information is simply too uncertain or unavailable at the
time of the litigation. For instance, several juries have held in favor of plaintiffs who
contended that taking the anti-nausea drug Bendectin while they were pregnant caused
their children's birth defects. Yet the best available scientific
evidence was then
68
unable, and remains unable, to support general causation.
Bendectin litigation itself produced one of the federal judiciary's most prominent
tools for managing science's quality: the evidentiary standard announced in Daubertv.
MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals,which governs the admissibility ofexpert testimony in
federal courts and many state courts. 69 Under the familiar Dauberttest, courts are to
ensure that expert testimony is both relevant and reliable, with the reliability inquiry
focusing on: (1) testability or falsifiability; (2) peer review and publication; (3) the
known or potential rate of error; and (4) the degree of acceptance in the field's
community. 70 At its core, Daubert is aimed at ensuring that scientific evidence meets
71
the same standards of reliability that the relevant scientific field itself would require.
Daubert is an important tool; although scholars debate its overall efficacy, 72 it
seems at the very least to have increased judicial sensitivity to the problem of "junk
science." 73 It does not solve every problem of science in the courts, however, and it
seems to have created a few of its own. First, Daubert may never come into play in
cases where the applicable procedural posture does not require consideration of
evidence, where Daubert challenges are never made, 74 or where Daubert does not

68. See Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989) (reversing
$550,000jury verdict); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(affirming district court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the over-one-million-dollar
verdict); see also Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., No. 82-1245, 1996 WL 680992 (D.C.
Super. Oct. 24, 1996) (collecting cases); FOsTER & HUBER, supra note 27, at 7 ("A few
statistically significant correlations have been reported in the literature, but taken together the
results are overwhelmingly negative.") (footnote omitted); David E. Bernstein, Learning the
Wrong Lessons from "An American Tragedy": A Critique of the Berger-Twerski Informed
Choice Proposal, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1961, 1966 (2006) ("A review of the relevant medical
literature finds a consensus that Bendectin is not a teratogen.").
69. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
70. Id. at 593-94; see also FED. R. EviD. 702 advisory committee's note (suggesting other
useful factors for determining reliability).
71. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95.
72. On Daubert'sshortcomings, see, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Doubting Daubert, 14 J.L. &
POL'Y 65 (2006); Erica Beecher-Monas, Blindedby Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in
Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REv. 55 (1998) (arguing courts misapply Daubert by
continuing to admit certain forms of forensic evidence). For a study of Daubert'soutcomes as
compared to the old Frye standard, see generally Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does
Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REv. 471
(2005).
73. Cheng & Yoon, supranote 72, at 503.
74. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999) (noting trial judge has
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apply.75 Second, Daubert was never meant to be a guarantee against scientific
uncertainty-it is a principle of evidence, not a rule of decision for how courts should
utilize policy in the gap of uncertainty.76 Proponents of scientific evidence "do not
have to demonstrate to the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the
assessments of their experts are correct, they only have to demonstrate by a
preponderance of evidence that their opinions are reliable." 77 Thus, the standard leaves
open the possibility of admitting testimony of experts who disagree. In the typical trial
scenario, this means that if the disagreements constitute genuine issues of material fact,
the uncertainties must be resolved by fact finders.7
Here lies one of the difficult tensions between science and law in the courts. If
science is uncertain, how can the judicial process purport to say what science is? One
response is that judicial answers should be thought of in probabilistic terms; for
example, ajury's finding that a manufacturer's product caused a disease is really only a
determination that causation was more likely than not. 79 Similarly, summary judgment
in favor of the manufacturer merely means that the plaintiff failed to show genuine
issues of material fact-not that there was in fact no causation.80 But those answers are
unsatisfactory in that they ignore the consumers of judicial outcomes; the public in
particular is quick to view a jury's determination ofcausation as one of scientific fact. l
Furthermore, whenever courts attempt to resolve scientific uncertainty-even if that
science was properly screened through the Daubert filter and even if that resolution
was only probabilistic-there is the danger that scientific consensus will later regard a
discretion "to avoid unnecessary 'reliability' proceedings in ordinary cases where the reliability
of an expert's methods is properly taken for granted ....).
75. For example, Daubertprinciples are generally not applied in judicial review governed
by the Administrative Procedures Act. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606,621-22 (7th
Cir. 1995) (declining invitation to apply Daubertprinciples as means of determining appropriate
level of agency deference); Stewart v. Potts, 996 F. Supp. 668, 678 n.8 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (noting
that Daubertstandards do not apply to judicial review of agency action). But see Alan C. Raul
& Julie Z. Dwyer, "Regulatory Daubert ": A Proposalto Enhance JudicialReview ofAgency
Science by IncorporatingDaubert Principles into Administrative Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 7 (2003) (arguing that Daubert standards should apply to judicial review of agency
action).
76. This is not to say that Daubertrulings are not outcome-determinative. As Daubertitself
showed on remand, excluding plaintiffs' causation expert meant that the plaintiffs could not bear
their burden of showing genuine issues of material fact and so the defendants were entitled to
summary judgment. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
77. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis in
original), cited with approval in FED R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note to the amended

rule.
78. See FED. R. EvID.702 advisory committee's note to the amended rule ("When a trial
court, applying this amendment, rules that an expert's testimony is reliable, this does not
necessarily mean that contradictory expert testimony is unreliable."); Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola
of P.R. Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Daubert neither requires nor empowers
trial courts to determine which of several competing scientific theories has the best
provenance.").
79. See ARIEL PORAT &ALEX STEIN, TORT LIAB1LrrY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 18-22 (2001)
(describing how the more-likely-than-not standard functions to evenly allocate the risk of error).
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(b)-(c).
81. See supra note 67 (describing reactions to Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 788 F.2d 741
( lIth Cir. 1986)).
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judicial outcome as wrong. Although the Daubert standard is young, several
illustrations have come to light. For example, post-Daubert breast implant litigation
garnered many favorable results for plaintiffs even though-according to the editor of
the New England Journal of Medicine-the cause-and-effect relationship between

silicone breast implants and disease is unproven, and will likely remain so. 82 Likewise,
courts have reached differing outcomes in toxic mold personal-injury cases under the
Daubert standard,
even though the science behind "toxic mold" is currently
s3
uncertain.

Another difficulty for courtroom science lies in the nature of the adversarial system
itself. Simply put, parties have every incentive to produce evidence favorable to their
respective sides, regardless of the quality of that science. 84 The resulting "battle of the
experts" places the fact finder in the unenviable position of deciding science based on
only limited information. In sum, the adversarial process will not necessarily produce a
full spectrum of scientific research on a particular topic, making it very different from
the formal and informal consensus-building methods that science itself uses.
This weakness may be amplified because judges and lawyers usually lack scientific
or technical backgrounds and may not even know what is missing.8 5 While judges in

82. MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIUA 195-98 (1996); see also David E. Bernstein, The
BreastImplant Fiasco,87 CAL. L. REv. 457,458 (1999) (reviewing MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE
ON TRIAL (1996)).
83. See Jeffrey J. Hayward, Comment, The Same Mold Story?: What Toxic Mold Is
Teaching Us About Causationin Toxic Tort Litigation, 83 N.C. L. REV. 518, 522-27 (2005)
(describing uncertainty regarding link between mold and human health). Compare New
Haverford P'ship v. Stroot, 772 A.2d 792 (Del. 2001) (upholding admissibility of scientific
evidence under Daubert standard and jury verdict in favor of toxic mold plaintiffs), with Roche
v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 278 F. Supp. 2d 744 (E.D. Va. 2003) (holding inadmissible, under
Daubertstandard, expert testimony regarding toxic mold).
84. Indeed, some scholars have decried the problem of litigation-driven science, to which
Daubert itself may be a contributing factor. E.g., William G. Childs, The Overlapping
Magisteriaof Law and Science: When Litigation and Science Collide, 85 NEB.L. REv. 643,
665-68 (2007); William L. Anderson, Barry M. Parsons & Drummond Rennie, Daubert's
Backwash: Litigation-GeneratedScience, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 619 (2001). Notably, on
remand in Daubert itself, the Ninth Circuit added litigation-driven science as a factor that cut
against reliability. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318-19 (9th Cir.
1995).
85. "Judges and lawyers usually react to science with all the enthusiasm of a child about to
get a tetanus shot." Bert Black, Francisco J. Ayala & Carol Saffran-Brinks, Science and the Law
in the Wake of Daubert: A New Searchfor Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEx. L. REv. 715, 716
(1994); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600-01 (1993)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I do not doubt that Rule 702 confides
to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility in deciding questions of the admissibility of
proffered expert testimony. But I do not think it imposes on them either the obligation or the
authority to become amateur scientists in order to perform that role."); Marconi Wireless Tel.
Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 60-61 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part) ("It is an old
observation that the training of Anglo-American judges ill fits them to discharge the duties cast
upon them by patent legislation."); Lawrence M. Sung, Echoes ofScientific Truth in theHalls of
Justice: The StandardsofReview Applied by the United States Court ofAppealsfor the Federal
Circuit in Patent-RelatedMatters, 48 Am.U. L. REv. 1233, 1241 (1999) (noting criticisms of
patent system and Federal Circuit "may be based solely upon an asserted lack of ability of the
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particular can draw on the assistance of special masters or court-appointed scientific
experts,86 this potential has gone largely untapped.87 According to Professor Cheng,
explanations likely include the difficulty courts can have identifying quality experts,
their expense (both in money and judicial efficiency), and a perception that they
interfere with the adversarial process.88 These transaction costs are likely difficult to
overcome in a lawsuit because they must be borne solely by plaintiffs and defendants;
even in class actions where plaintiffs' resources might be pooled, the cost spreading is
not nearly what can be achieved in a legislature.
A common denominator of many of these issues is not just scientific uncertainty but
the nature of the scientific question presented. When a court is asked to resolve a
question science itself has not resolved, it is simply unequipped to do so because legal
values-and more particularly, the judicial process--do not employ the scientific
method. I call these types of questions qualitative, or non-binary; for example: Does
Bendectin cause birth defects? Will a statute establishing a cap-and-trade program for
emissions reduce global warming? 89
While courts are poorly situated, from an institutional perspective, to resolve these
types of questions, they have a significant institutional strength in answering what I call
binary questions. That is, when the scientific issue relates to "certain," or positive
science-such as a judicially noticeable scientific fact-no additional scientific
methodology needs to be employed. Instead, usual legal-system values easily discern a
binary answer in a way indistinct from courts' other fact-finding methods.
Importantly, science need not relate only to the judicial-notice end of the certainty
spectrum to be presented as a binary issue. To truly evaluate comparative scientific
institutional competence, it is necessary to appreciate that different types of scientific
questions may be relevant to a legal issue. Examples of binary questions might be:
Have scientists observed a warming trend? Is there scientific uncertainty regarding the
extent to which temperatures will rise in the next fifty years? These binary questions
stand in marked contrast to a related non-binary question: How much will temperatures
rise in the next fifty years?
Courts are very good at reaching binary decisions relatively quickly. Consider the
classic example of a plaintiff and defendant each testifying whether the traffic light was
legal arbiter to determine scientific truth or merit"); Markey, supra note 16, at 538 (regarding
preparatory education, "[a]n interdisciplinary approach is needed in which those planning a
career in law would learn about science and scientists, and in which science students would
learn about law and lawyers"). Some studies suggest that judges make many of the same
mistakes attributed to jurors when processing scientific information. See, e.g., Neil Vidmar &
Shari S. Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 1121, 1170-73 (2001)
(collecting studies and noting that in one example, only four percent ofjudges could provide an
explanation of falsifiability that revealed a clear understanding of that attribute). See generally
Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REv. 777 (2001) (presenting results of empirical study suggesting judges use
heuristics that can produce systematic errors in judgment).
86. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 706 (authorizing appointment of expert witnesses).
87. See generallyEdward K. Cheng, IndependentJudicialResearchin the Daubert Age, 56
DuKE L.J. 1263 (2007) (arguing for independent judicial research as a more effective
alternative).
88. Id.
at 1271-72.
89. See, e.g., S.3036, 110th Cong. § 3(1) (as introduced May 20, 2008) (stating purpose of
establishing program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions).
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green or red; the role of the fact finder has always been to decide which it is and reach
a yes-or-no, win-or-lose result. 90 More subtly, judges reach binary decisions at every
step of the pretrial process: whether to grant or deny a motion to dismiss, a motion for
summary judgment, or a motion in limine, for example. These types ofbinary decisions
benefit from the adversarial process because that process is an effective way to ensure
that the very strongest arguments for each outcome are presented. Furthermore, courts
are expected to reach these decisions within a reasonable timeframe, providing finality
to the litigants.
Because courts are so well-versed in reaching binary outcomes, it makes sense that
where a scientific issue demands only a binary answer-such as whether there is
scientific uncertainty-a court would not have the same difficulties as with attempting
to resolve the uncertainty itself. For this reason, it is critical to factor the type of
scientific question into any analysis of whether scientific avoidance is appropriate. In
addition, doing so provides a useful standpoint from which to compare the scientific
capabilities of courts and legislatures.
C. Science in the Legislatures
On the surface, courts and legislatures face many of the same hurdles with respect to
scientific uncertainty. While science aspires to be apolitical as a general matter, those
who bring it to a legislature-whether as legislators themselves or interested groupsare incentivized by the very nature of that institution to present science in a manner that
tends to support a particular political decision. Indeed, legislatures use a different sort
of adversarial process that nevertheless suffers from weaknesses similar to those of the
courts. Further, legislators as a group have only a marginally larger percentage of
members with scientific or technical backgrounds. Even so, anecdotal evidence
suggests legislatures are far better positioned than courts to make decisions in light of
scientific uncertainty. These observations raise some fundamental questions: How do
legislatures learn about science? What are the institutional strengths and weaknesses
associated with that process? And to what extent does the legislative process capture
"good" science?
Collecting scientific information is well within the inherent legislative investigative
91
power to conduct inquiries concerning existing laws as well as potential statutes.
Although this broad capability is frequently held up as a rationale for judicial
restraint-the idea being that legislatures are better fact finders than courts 92-there

90. See Green, supra note 59 at 391 ("Whereas science can duck issues of [particular
difficulty] by asserting that the evidence is inconclusive, a court does not have this luxury.
When a lawsuit is filed, the case must be decided in a binary manner: liability or no liability.").
91. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) ("The power of the Congress to
conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad."); see also
Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544 (1963) ("[T]here can be no
question that the State has power adequately to inform itself-through legislative investigation,
if it so desires. .. ."); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959) ("The scope of the

power of inquiry, in short, is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and
appropriate under the Constitution.").
92. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 309 (1997) ("Congress has the capacity
to investigate and analyze facts beyond anything the Judiciary could match."); Turner Broad.
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seems to be little empirical basis for making such a claim.93 Nevertheless, it is true that
legislatures have a far broader universe of scientific and technological resources than
do courts. Congress, for example, has the powers to conduct hearings and subpoena
witnesses on science and technology generally, and can also obtain expert advice from
the National Academies ("Academies"), a rich source of expertise in science,
engineering, and medicine. 94 A sampling of congressionally requested Academies
studies illustrates the broad scope and scale of scientific studies that may be ordered.
For example, the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 200795 mandates
that the Institute of Medicine conduct a study and report to Congress on certain
pediatric research. 96 Another mandate requires a "multi-year, comprehensive in-water
study" to measure the efforts, effects, and impact of turtle excluder devices used by
shrimp fisheries; 97 the same Act also directs the Secretary of Commerce to request the
National Research Council to conduct a study of the acidification of oceans and the
impact on the United States. 98 Yet another study will investigate the incidence and
impact of addictions to prescription opioid analgesics. 99
Congress may also avail itself of the Congressional Research Service (CRS), which
is the public policy research arm of Congress; this source of information links science
and policy. For example, CRS consulted with Congress regarding EPA's air quality
standards for particulate matter, providing an analysis of the history of air standards,
legislative requirements for setting those standards, and potential health and economic
impacts of the EPA's proposed standards. 100 Of note is CRS's nonpartisan approach to
Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 672 n.4 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (noting the "deference this Court should accord to the factfinding abilities of the nation's
legislature") (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 46 (D.D.C. 1993)). But see
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down Violence Against Women Act
where Congress made insufficient showing connecting violence to interstate commerce); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (making a similar finding with respect to guns in school
zones). For a recent article criticizing these cases, see Ruth Colker &James J.Brudney, Dissing
Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 83 (2001) ("[T]he Court has undermined Congress's ability to
decide for itself how and whether to create a record in support of pending legislation.").
93. See FAIGMAN, supra note 19, at 8 (stating that this premise is likely inaccurate, and in
any event, is unsound as a matter of constitutional principle).
94. "[T]he National Academy shall. . . , whenever called upon by any department of the
Government, investigate, examine, experiment, and report upon any subject of science or art,
the actual expense of such investigations, examinations, experiments, and reports, to be paid
from appropriations which may be made for the purpose . . . ." An Act to Incorporate the
National Academy of Sciences, ch. 111, § 1, 12 Stat. 806 (1863); see also About the National
Academies, http://www.nationalacademies.org/about/.
95. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat.
823 (2007).
96. Id.§ 505B(l)(1), 121 Stat. at 874.

97. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-479, § 212, 120 Stat. 3618 (2007).
98. Id. § 701, 120 Stat. at 3649.

99. Office ofNational Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109469, § 1106, 120 Stat. 3541 (2006).
100.

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR

2006, at 26,

available at http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/CRS06_AnnRpt.pdf. Much of CRS's work is
unavailable to the general public. See BRUCE A. BIMBER, THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE IN
CONGRESS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 79 (1996) ("CRS is
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its analyses. As one commentator describes, CRS strictly guards against offering policy
recommendations and even reviews outgoing reports for neutrality and balance.' 0 1The
Government Accountability Office, another agency that works for Congress, provides
policy analysis aimed at making government function
more effectively; its role
02
naturally intersects with many scientific endeavors. 1
These examples are notable because they highlight the ability of Congress to obtain
full-blown science-studies conducted by scientists, according to the scientific method,
in separate institutions. The luxury of being able to call on separate institutions for
informational needs enables better decision making in a legislature, but is antithetical to
the adversarial system of courts, which largely limits information to that provided by
the parties. And as an aspirational matter, science requested from the Academies
should not be biased by propter hoc political expectations. By contrast, science is
marshaled for the purpose of furthering particular outcomes in the judicial branch.
Furthermore, the impetus for judicial science comes from the parties themselvesusually not the impartial court. Finally, Congress can in many instances wait for
scientific information to become available before deciding the best course of action.
Courts do not have this luxury of time.
In spite of this tremendous capacity to obtain scientific information, legislatures
03
may not have incentives to engage in careful fact finding, if they engage in it at all.1
Although the costs of such research can be spread more broadly than in litigation, the
political nature of legislatures means committees have considerable opportunities to
screen and channel sources of facts toward particular policy-driven goals.'104 Moreover,
facts provided by lobbyists may find their way into the legislative record-again
suggesting a process that is more policy-driven than those of courts and science.105 And
even after a statute has been passed, the ability of a legislature to alter the statute based

officially forbidden from publicly distributing most of its documents.").
101. BIMBER, supra note 100, at 82. Even so, CRS prepares reports in support of particular
legislation by adopting the legislator's viewpoint and labeling its product "directed writing,"
which is not officially traceable to the agency. Id. at 82-83.
102. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, About GAO, http://www.gao.gov/about/.
For examples of its policy analysis, see U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CLIMATE
CHANGE RESEARCH: AGENCIES HAVE DATA-SHARING POLICIES BUT COULD Do MORE TO
ENHANCE THE AVAILABILITY OF DATA FROM FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH (2007), availableat

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071172.pdf; U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GLOBAL HEALTH: U.S. AGENCIES SUPPORT PROGRAMS TO BUILD OVERSEAS CAPACITY FOR
INFECTIOUS

DISEASE

SURVEILLANCE

(2007),

available

at

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07ll86.pdf. Until 1995, there was also a Congressional Office
of Technology Assessment, which provided members and committees analyses of scientific and
technological subjects. Topics ranged from the cost-effectiveness of colorectal screening in
average-risk adults to biologically based technologies for pest control. See Princeton University,
OTA Publications by Year: 1995, http://www.princeton.edu/-ota/ns20/year f.html.
103. See State v. Kantner, 493 P.2d 306, 310 n.5 (Haw. 1976) ("We know of nothing that
compels the Legislature to thoroughly investigate the available scientific and medical evidence
when enacting a law.") (emphasis in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Leis, 243 N.E.2d 898,
901-02 (Mass. 1969)).
104. CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 225 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds.,

2005).
105. See id.(noting potential impact of lobbyists and special interest groups); see also
KOMESAR, supra note 65, at 54-58 (describing interest group theory of politics).
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on changes in facts (or the revelation that facts were wrong in the first place) depends
on its ability to overcome significant inertia; the combination of limited time and
nearly unlimited demands on legislatures
means that there are large hurdles to cross
6
before they can revisit statutes.'
Nor are legislatures required, as a general matter, to put science to any test of
reliability. Courts have soundly rejected invitations to review evidence relied upon by
legislatures for compliance with the Daubertstandard. 0 7 Where uncertain science is at
issue, the lack of standards suggests legislatures might be susceptible to the same "junk
science" problems as courts. But interestingly, there are few examples in the scholarly
literature of legislatures getting positive science wrong.'08 Indeed, neither the major
scientific organizations nor the legal scholarship suggest that getting positive science
wrong is a systemic problem of legislatures. This lack of evidence might be attributed
to a general failure to empirically examine the science in statutes.'0 9 But as Professor
Wagner notes with respect to her research regarding environmental statutes, the
absence of criticism regarding positive science is noteworthy, particularly when
compared to the attention given to such deficiencies in courts.' 10 As she explains, the
incentives lean toward getting positive science right because positive science is
politically appealing."1'
Indeed, if we view legislatures as a place for robust debate from both sides of an
issue, we would expect the political process itself to ferret out "bad" science, just as we
would rely on the adversarial model of the judiciary to do the same thing. To be sure,
the premise of robust debate is weak, as many have documented."12 Yet it does suggest
the possibility that, like courts, legislatures can produce good results with respect to
positive science. Of course, legislatures' approaches to scientific uncertainty are much
more difficult to assess because the resulting statutes are ultimately policy choices. As
compared to courts, the most we can say is that legislatures have comparatively better
tools at their disposal. Whether they use those tools effectively, therefore, ought to be a
factor in scientific avoidance analyses.
To summarize, courts and legislatures both bring relative strengths and weaknesses
to scientific fact finding, the effects of which are likely to be more concentrated when
uncertain science is at issue. Both institutions are weak in the sense that the major
players often lack scientific or technical backgrounds, though to be fair, both are

106. See Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let CongressDo It": The Casefor an Absolute Rule of
Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REv. 177, 190-91 (1989); Mathew D. McCubbins &

Thomas Schwartz, Congressional OversightOverlooked-PolicePatrols Versus FireAlarms, 28
AM. J. POL. ScI. 165, 166 (1984).
107. See Gammoh v. City of La Jabra, 395 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2005); G.M. Enters.,
Inc. v. Town of St. Joseph, 350 F.3d 631, 640 (7th Cir. 2003); UFO Chuting of Haw., Inc. v.
Young, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1163 (D. Haw. 2005).
108. But see Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1638 (2007).
109. See Wendy E. Wagner, Congress,Science, andEnvironmentalPolicy, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REv. 181, 198-99 (noting that perhaps some environmental legislation is so technical that
scholars avoid it or are unprepared to critique it).
110. Id.
111. Id. at221.
112. See, e.g., KOMEsAR, supra note 65, at 53-97 (describing theories of majoritarian
influence and minority bias).
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populated with smart people, many of whom work hard to understand the science at
issue. Both are susceptible to missing a full consideration of science due to their
adversarial-judicial or adversarial-political processes. Although legislatures have better
tools than the courts for evaluating uncertain science, the disincentives to using those
tools are high and suggest that whether and how those tools are used might be a casespecific factor for considering scientific avoidance. Finally, with respect to binary
questions of science, neither institution appears to have a significant advantage over
the other. With these considerations in mind, we can develop a typology from which to
analyze scientific avoidance.
II. SCIENTIFIC

AVOIDANCE IN CONTEXT

A. Tracing the Development of Scientific Avoidance
This Part traces the development of the scientific avoidance principle while
critically examining its application. Originally applied to the most basic of state police
powers, the principle's use took a notable shift in the latter part of the twentieth century
and is now cited more frequently in opinions reviewing legislative acts that are more
intrusive on individual rights. With this shift, however, came a decrease in the
principle's usefulness.
The answers to two questions are critical to understanding this change and its
implications. First, I ask what type of scientific issue is presented-binary or nonbinary. As the cases show, courts do not make distinctions regarding the types of
scientific questions at issue when choosing scientific avoidance. But to overlook the
scientific particularities is a mistake because they have direct bearing on the legitimacy
of implementing scientific avoidance. To the extent that scientific avoidance tips the
interbranch balance toward legislatures, it should be grounded in a determination that
the scientific issue is one that is better addressed in legislatures. By contrast, as we
have seen, binary scientific issues are likely as easily handled by courts as by
legislatures.
The second question asks about the relevance of the scientific issue to the
substantive law, the answer to which should make a difference whether scientific
avoidance is appropriate at all. Where science plays only a supporting role in
illustrating what is within the realm of reasonableness, the corresponding standard of
review will reflect the notion that courts' intervention is not particularly critical. But
where the standard of review encompasses special reasons for invoking courts'
countermajoritarian role, the corresponding scientific issues may appropriately be a
matter of constitutional fact finding.
This approach reflects one final point about scientific avoidance-that of
terminology. As already mentioned, the term "scientific avoidance" itself is meant to
capture some of the ideals supporting constitutional avoidance. A familiar explanation
of constitutional avoidance provides that "[t]he Court will not pass upon a
constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of."" '3 Corollaries

113. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288,347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
See generally Philip P. Frickey, Gettingfrom Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon,
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include the rule that courts should construe statutes to avoid finding them
unconstitutional, as well as the principles limiting Supreme Court review of state court
judgments when there are adequate, independent state grounds.ll 4 The canon and its
corollaries serve several purposes; most particularly, they are meant to avoid
confrontations with other coequal branches (or states), thereby preserving judicial
"a sensible ambiguity-resolving rule" that
legitimacy. 15 More practically, they provide
16
can help conserve judicial resources.'
Carefully applied, scientific avoidance ought to reach similar concerns. As noted
already, the resolution of uncertain science will not supply answers. Relatedly, a
decision made in light of uncertain scientific information is at its core a decision of
policy. Like constitutional avoidance, scientific avoidance presumes that legislatures
are generally better and more legitimately equipped to make such policy decisions. In
that sense, scientific avoidance is a doctrine of deference to a coequal branch or of
comity to a state. Its baseline view is that deference is indeed appropriate when
legislatures have made decisions on matters of scientific uncertainty. But scientific
avoidance also encompasses the flexibility needed to justify lesser degrees of
deference, just as constitutional avoidance anticipates that sometimes, a confrontation
between branches is justifiably unavoidable. This understanding thus provides
additional support for differentiating scientific avoidance cases based on the relevance
of the scientific question to the legal issue.
Thus, two questions inform the analysis and application of scientific avoidance.
First, what type of scientific question is presented? Second, what is the question's
relevance to the legal issue? These questions suggest a framework running along two
axes. The first axis relates to the type of scientific issue. As a matter of the relative
institutional capabilities of courts and legislatures, courts can more legitimately
determine issues of a binary nature. By comparison, legislatures are better situated, at
least in the abstract, to consider issues of a non-binary, or qualitative, nature.
The second axis relates to the relevance of science to the standard of review. Again
this axis can be divided in a way that reflects basic views of institutional competence;
the first category relates to scientific issues that are relevant to a legal issue under a
heightened standard of review, where courts are viewed as legitimately scrutinizing
legislative actions. The second category, where science provides only a spectrum of
reasonableness, applies where there is no special reason for courts to meddle with their
elected counterpart. 17 Table 1 presents the resulting framework:
Legal Process Theory, and NarrowingStatutoryInterpretationin the Early Warren Court,93
CAL. L. REv. 397,399-401 (2005) (emphasizing prominence, but describing criticism, of Justice
Brandeis's statement of the canon of constitutional avoidance). For a comprehensive look at
constitutional avoidance and its structural, democracy-forcing function, see Dan T. Coenen, A
Constitution of Collaboration:Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of
InterbranchDialogue,42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1575, 1604-16 (2001).
114. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 347 (citation omitted).
115. Coenen, supra note 113, at 1608 ("By reserving constitutional intervention to instances
of the most pressing urgency, the Court minimizes potentially power-sapping confrontations
with coordinate branches, portrays itself as temperate in character, conserves judicial capital,
and, through all this, solidifies its claim to exercise the power of judicial review."); see also
Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 405, 469
(1989) (phrasing purposes of avoidance in terms of separation of powers values).
116. Coenen, supra note, 113 at 1607.
117. These categories loosely reflect, but are not limited to, the two-tier structure the Court
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Table 1. Framework for Scientific Avoidance
Relevance of Question

Type of Question
Binary

Non-Binary/Qualitative

Spectrum of Reason

Quadrant II

QuadrantI

Heightened Review

QuadrantIII

QuadrantIV

In the discussion that follows, I use this framework to characterize several scientific
avoidance cases.n1 In selecting the quadrants, I focus on how the court actually
characterized the scientific issue and its relevance, as opposed to ways the court might
have done so. This descriptive approach allows for a normative critique and also
provides insights into how this framework can be used to realize the full potential of
scientific avoidance.
1. Origins
The earliest scientific avoidance cases involved judicial review of state statutes
grounded in states' most basic police powers. Jacobson v. Massachusettsprovides an
example. 19 There, a citizen challenged, on substantive due process grounds, a
Massachusetts statute enabling localities to implement mandatory smallpox
vaccinations. The citizen was charged with failing to be vaccinated as required, and in
his defense he contended that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment.1 20 At
trial, the defendant made numerous offers of proof aimed at showing the dangers of
smallpox vaccinations, but the trial court excluded all his evidence and he was
convicted.
The Supreme Court reviewed the proffered evidence on appeal, but determined that
the evidence would not have made a difference because the statute was an exercise of
broad police powers.' 2' As the Court explained, a state's police powers "must be held
to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative
enactment as will protect the public health and safety.' 22 Thus, the state's power was

employs in substantive due process and equal protection analyses. However, for purposes of the
typology, I do not distinguish between highly deferential rational basis review, as in Lindsley v.
NaturalCarbonicGas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), and rational basis review with bite, as in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). In addition, I put cases
involving scrutiny higher than reasonableness, such as for gender as in UnitedStates v. Virginia,

518 U.S. 515 (1996), in the heightened category, even if they would not qualify for strict
scrutiny, as in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
118. Although many of the examples involve U.S. Supreme Court review of federal or state
legislative acts, there is no reason the framework should not apply to state supreme court review
of state legislative acts.
119. 197U.S. 11(1905).

120. Id. at 26.
121. Id.at 24-25.

122. Id.
at 25.
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bounded only where a statute was arbitrary or unreasonable. 123 In light ofthe smallpox
epidemic and the reasonable statutory scheme that delegated decision-making power to
local boards of health, the statute was no different from other public health measures
such as quarantine laws. 124 Furthermore, the Court did not examine what particular
information Massachusetts considered when choosing to require vaccinations: "We
must assume that when the statute in question was passed, the legislature of
and
Massachusetts was not unaware ofthese opposing theories
1 25 [as to vaccines' safety],
was compelled, of necessity, to choose between them."
Even with this highly deferential standard, the Court briefly reviewed the state of
scientific opinion regarding the efficacies and dangers of vaccinations. It described
studies throughout Europe, particularly in London, France, and Belgium, that
26
supported the importance of vaccinations for reducing the incidence of the disease.1
In a survey of 552 physicians in Britain, for example, only two had spoken against the
utility of the vaccination. 127Here the Court seemed to be double checking to make sure
that there was some basis for what it concluded was a "common belief," 128 held by the
lay public as well as the medical profession, that smallpox vaccines were appropriate
public health measures. The facts of some remaining uncertainty, a lack of an absolute
consensus, and a possibility that science might yet prove the current belief wrong were
laws it viewed as
not fatal because the legislature was well within its power to pass
129
promoting the common welfare, "whether it does in fact or not."
The Court grounded its reasoning in principles at the heart of scientific avoidance
values. The "relations existing between the different departments of government"
informed the scope of the Court's review such that only an arbitrary act, or one which
ran afoul of some particular constitutional guarantee, would justify the Court's invasion
into the legislature's province.13 0 The Court repeatedly emphasized that it was
reviewing an act of a legislature-which expressed the will of the people-and it
explained that a single individual could not utilize the courts to dominate the majority's
will.",
I place the science of Jacobson in the non-binary, qualitative category. The Court
was not called upon to consider whether there was a dispute as to the efficacy of the
vaccine. Nor was it asked to determine, in this particular instance, whether the
smallpox vaccine would harm this particular plaintiff.' 32 Instead, it was asked to survey

123. Id. at 28.
124. Id. at28-29.
125. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
126. Id.
at31 n.1.
127. Id.
at 32 n.1.
at 34 (quoting Viemeister v. White, 72 N.E. 97, 99 (1904)).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 35 (quoting Viemeister v. White, 72 N.E. 97, 99 (1904)) (emphasis added); see
also id. ("While we do not decide and cannot decide that vaccination is a preventive of
smallpox, we take judicial notice of the fact that this is the common belief of the people of the
State, and with this fact as a foundation we hold that the statute in question is a health law,
enacted in a reasonable and proper exercise of the police power.").

130. Id. at 31.
131. Id. at38.
132. Id.at 30-31. Notably, the Court left open the possibility that the statute might be
unconstitutional in an as-applied challenge where an adult could show in his particular case that
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evidence reflecting the available scientific information to decide whether it was
reasonable to require the vaccination as a prospective matter. To the extent the citizen
challenging the statute was asking the Court to choose a different side than the
legislature in the scientific debate, he was asking the Court to engage in an analysis that
would not have been at the heart of its institutional capabilities.
Likewise, the relevance of the science to the substantive standard was in its ability
to define the scope of reasonableness. The legislature was well within legitimate
scientific standards. Therefore, the Court did not need to resolve the scientific
uncertainty itself to reach a determination of reasonableness. This explanation raises an
interesting question: suppose the legislature had decided that, in light of the potential
for these vaccines to cause rather than prevent harm, it would ban localities from
mandating the vaccines until further information was available. The answer of course,
is that it would be perfectly reasonable for a legislature to choose a precautionary
approach, even if doing so sided with the minority in scientific thought.'33
Thus, Jacobson is solidly within Quadrant I. As an institutional matter, the
legislature was better equipped to consider matters of scientific uncertainty related to
vaccines, and there was no special reason for the courts to interfere with the resulting
policy decision. Examples following the Jacobson pattern continue to arise, with
similar results. Thus, courts have rejected challenges to the fluoridation of public
drinking water, 134 bans on indoor public smoking,13 5 zoning ordinances aimed at
protecting the environment,' 36 and other restrictions designed to protect human
the vaccine would cause serious bodily harm. Id. at 39. This possibility is similarly noted in
Gonzales v. Carhart(Carhartl),127 S.Ct. 1610, 1638 (2007) ("[T]hese facial attacks should
not have been entertained in the first instance. In these circumstances the proper means to
consider exceptions is by as-applied challenge."), discussed infratext accompanying notes 239255.

133. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93,97 (1979) ("The Constitution presumes that, absent
some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the
democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how
unwisely we may think a political branch has acted."); Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of
Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1913) ("The problems of government are practical ones and may
justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations-illogical, it may be, and unscientific.").
134. E.g., Coshow v. City of Escondido, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 33 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(upholding city's plan to fluoridate drinking water; plaintiff's reliance on potential harmful

effects associated with fluoride compound insufficient to overcome rational health-and-safety
basis for plan); Quiles v. City of Boynton Beach, 802 So. 2d 397 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(similar); Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 127 N.E.2d 609 (Ohio 1955) (similar); Chapman v. City
of Shreveport, 74 So. 2d 142 (La. 1954) (rejecting challenge to fluoridation of public drinking
water where plaintiffs relied on possible adverse consequences associated with exposure to
fluoride but other scientific evidence supported legislature's decision).
135. E.g., NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. City of New York, 315 F. Supp. 2d 461,495 (S.D.N.Y.

2004) ("[D]ue process does not require a legislative body to await concrete proof of reasonable
but unproven assumptions before acting to safeguard the health of its citizens.") (emphasis
omitted) (citation omitted); Fagan v. Axelrod, 550 N.Y.S.2d 552, 557-58 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990)
("Even if scientific evidence demonstrating the deleterious effect of environmental tobacco
smoke were not so overwhelming as it is, it would not be the prerogative of this Court to contest
the wisdom of the Legislature in choosing what evidence to credit.").
136. E.g., UFO Chuting of Haw., Inc. v. Young, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (D. Haw. 2005)
(upholding statute banning seasonal parasailing in certain navigable waters for purpose of

protecting humpback whales in face of challenge to quality of science used by legislature).
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health. 137 All of these instances involved Quadrant I, with non-binary, qualitative
questions of scientific uncertainty, where the science was relevant to showing the
bounds of the subject matter's reasonableness.
2. Classifications
Another natural fit for scientific avoidance is legislative definitions; legislatures
have traditionally been afforded wide latitude in defining the objects of statutes. This
makes intuitive sense: even if there is scientific uncertainty how something should be
classified or defined, a legislative definition merely delineates the scope of the statute.
Provided that scope does not run afoul of some other constitutional principle, 38 courts
seem to view definitions--quite rightly-as a practical necessity. Thus, there is no
need for a judicial rehashing of the science involved because the definitional
components of statutes represent legislative policy choices.
In Collins v. Texas, for example, the Court confronted a substantive due process
challenge to a state licensing statute aimed at regulating the practice of medicine.13 9
Petitioner Collins was held for practicing medicine for money without having
registered proof of his authority to do so with the State of Texas pursuant to the
statute. 140 Collins was an osteopath, 14 and he claimed that the Texas statute's broad
definition of practicing medicine was irrational because its breadth extended to those
who practiced the healing arts without administering drugs. 42 Essentially, his claim
was that osteopathy was not medicine and the state could not constitutionally claim
otherwise.
Justice Holmes wrote the opinion for the Court. Using reasoning that sounded in
scientific avoidance principles, he emphasized that the Act's only object was to define

137. E.g., Price v. Illinois, 238 U.S. 446,452 (1915) (upholding prohibition on sale of food
preservatives containing boric acid; debatable danger to public health viewed as strong reason
for deference to legislature); Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City and County of San Francisco, 216
U.S. 358 (1910) (upholding ordinance forbidding burial of dead within city and county limits,
while acknowledging differences in opinion regarding burial-related safety issues); Cal.
Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works of San Francisco, 199 U.S. 306, 320-21 (1905)

(upholding ordinance specifying particular disposal methods for municipal waste, while
acknowledging scientific uncertainty as to best disposal methods).
138. See, e.g., State v. Kantner, 493 P.2d 306, 308 (Haw. 1972) (suggesting state

legislature's power to define terms might be subject to certain state-constitutional procedural
constraints, such as one-title, one-subject rule).
139. 223 U.S. 288, 294 (1912).
140. Id.
141. According to the American Academy of Osteopathy, "[o]steopathic medicine is a
complete system of medical care. The philosophy is to treat the whole person, not just the
symptoms. It emphasizes the interrelationships of structure and function, and the appreciation of

the body's ability to heal itself." American Academy of Osteopathy, What is Osteopathy?,
http://academyofosteopathy.org/whatis.cfn.
142. Collins, 223 U.S. at 296-97. The statute provided that any person who "shall treat or
offer to treat any disease or disorder, mental or physical, or any physical deformity or injury, by
any system or method, or to effect cures thereof, and charge therefor, directly or indirectly,
money or other compensation" would be regarded as practicing medicine. Id. at 295.
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its applicability. 143 As applied, it was rational for the state to require some scientific
training as a prerequisite to practicing osteopathy because, in contrast to nursing or
massage therapy, osteopaths made a claim to "greater science."' 144 In the end, however,
Justice Holmes noted that perhaps the Court had discussed the case more than
necessary-after all, it was already established that the State had a right "to adopt a
policy even
on medical matters conceming which there is difference of opinion and
145
dispute."'
Classifications continue to be challenged on science-related grounds. In the customs
context, for example, eo nomine146 terms are accorded their common meanings, which
are presumed to be their commercial meanings. 147 Thus, "where the scientific meaning
of a tariffterm differs from the term's common or commercial meaning, the term is not
to be construed according to the scientific meaning, absent a contrary intent by
Congress in using the term."' 148 As its definition implies, this rule embodies strong
scientific avoidance principles and is based on the rationale that persons involved in
commerce would be expected to have familiarity with commercial and common
meanings rather than scientific ones. 14 9 By implementing rules defaulting to those
meanings, courts do not leave parties to second-guess possible outcomes, which
presumably means less litigation and also provides some stability on which commerce
may operate.
Consider, for example, Aldrich Chemical Co. v. United States,15 0 a case involving
the customs classification of an organic chemical compound. The dispute hinged on
whether the compound, which was undisputedly nitrogenous, could also be classified

143. Id. at 296.
144. Id.
at 296-97.
145. Id.at 297-98. Regulation of healthcare practitioners is a traditional area for this
principle's application. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483,487 (1955) ("[I]t is
for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of [a new statute
dealing with regulation of visual care].").
146. "An 'eo nomine' designation is one which describes a commodity by [a] specific name,
usually one well known to commerce." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 535 (6th ed. 1990).

147. Swan v. Arthur, 103 U.S. 597, 598 (1881) ("While tariff acts are generally to be
construed according to the commercial understanding of the terms employed, language will be
presumed to have the same meaning in commerce that it has in ordinary use, unless the contrary
is shown.").
148. Alexandria Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 13 Ct. Int'l Trade 689, 692 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1989).
149. Two Hundred Chests of Tea, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 430,438-39 (1824). Occasionally this
principle has resulted in commercial classifications wholly at odds with positive science. See
Dalquest v. United States, 53 Cust. Ct. 99, 109 (Cust. Ct. 1964) (classifying sea lion carcasses
as fish not fit for human consumption); Cent. Commercial Co. v. United States, 11 Ct. Cust.
131, 133 (Ct. Cust. App. 1921) ("We are regretfully forced to the conclusion that judges,
legislators, and people in general have classified the whale as a fish, and as the popular
acceptation of tariff terms having no different commercial meaning must prevail as against their
scientific signification, we must hold that the whale is a fish and that its flesh is fish .. ");
see
also infra text accompanying note 256 (discussing how to address binary holdings counter to
science in scientific avoidance context).
150. 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 192 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981).
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as an alkaloid.' 51The court heard extensive scientific testimony regarding the origin
and synthesis of the compound, and concluded that the compound was considered an
alkaloid. 52 The court declined, however, to adopt a new definition of alkaloid that
would resolve the ambiguities that had given rise to the dispute before it. In so doing, it
exercised scientific avoidance:
In the final analysis, the Court did not try to arrive at a new and more accurate
definition of alkaloids, although plaintiff's proposed definition did appear to be
more satisfactory. This was not necessary in light of its conclusion that [the
compound] is an alkaloid within the traditional definition. Nor is the Court of the
opinion that it ought to undertake to define so specialized a term in a manner
which has not yet gained acceptance in the field, even though the traditional
definition is losing its value.153At least it should not do so unless there is no other
way to arriveat a decision.

Thus, where an overriding purpose (like facilitating commerce) depends on
predictability and eschews scientific uncertainty, a doctrine that unapologetically looks
for answers outside of science can further avoidance and legal-system values at the
same time.
This variety of scientific avoidance is not limited to customs classifications.
Numerous challenges to drug laws, for example, have contended that cocaine or
marijuana is improperly classified as a scientific matter rendering related criminal
penalties unconstitutional. 5 4 In particular, United States v. Brookins provides a
straightforward illustration of scientific avoidance in Quadrant I. The Brookins
defendant brought a motion to dismiss his indictment under the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,151 contending that Congress could not have
rationally classified cocaine as a narcotic. 156 The court denied the motion, inquiring
only whether the statute bore any rational relationship to a legitimate legislative

151. Id. at 193. Alkaloids are naturally occurring chemical compounds containing basic
nitrogen. Examples include morphine and nicotine. See WEBsTER's ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY 54 (1996).
152. Aldrich Chemical,2 Ct. Int'l Trade at 195. The court examined "usage in the scientific
community" to determine whether the compound was an alkaloid. Id. Although the court did not
discuss the point, the usage upon which it settled was presumably that accepted in commerce as
well as in some scientific circles, while a more nuanced view of the (unsettled) science might
have provided a different definition.
153. Id. at 196-97 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
154. See United States v. Brookins, 383 F. Supp. 1212, 1215-16 (D.N.J. 1974), affd, 524
F.2d 1404 (3d Cir. 1979) (upholding classification of non-narcotic cocaine as narcotic for legal
purposes); State v. Kantner, 493 P.2d 306, 308 (Haw. 1972) ("The legislature has broad power
to define terms for a particular legislative purpose, and the courts ... are bound to follow
legislative definitions of terms rather than commonly accepted dictionary, judicial or scientific
definitions."); see also Commonwealth v. Leis, 243 N.E.2d 898, 901-02 (Mass. 1969) ("We

know nothing that compels the Legislature to thoroughly investigate the available scientific and
medical evidence when enacting a law." (emphasis in original)).
155. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2006).
156. Brookins, 383 F. Supp. at 1213-14. The defendant contended that this classification as
applied violated substantive due process and equal protection. Id.
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purpose. 157 A simple review of the parties' affidavits satisfied the court that "there is an
honest scientific difference of opinion concerning the effects of cocaine."' 58 That
difference alone was sufficient to uphold the statute. 159
Collins, Brookins, and Aldrich Chemical fit easily within Quadrant I. First, they
involve the scientific uncertainty of classification-a scientific enterprise that relies on
perhaps uncertain mechanisms of biology, chemistry, and physics in a qualitative
manner. This characteristic makes the legislature somewhat better than the courts for
considering the science at issue, weighing in favor of scientific avoidance. Second, the
relevance of the scientific question is in its bearing on a statute's rationality-a realm
already accustomed to very deferential treatment.
3. Prohibition Era
Another early line of cases involved challenges to Prohibition-era statutes that
proscribed the use of intoxicants for medicinal purposes. Although these cases are
somewhat confined to the unique circumstances of Prohibition, they are worth
consideration because they are frequently cited as justification for modern-day
scientific avoidance, including in CarhartIand 11.'60
In Everard's Breweriesv. Day,161 the Court considered whether section two of the
Supplemental Prohibition Act was constitutional insofar as it prevented physicians
from prescribing intoxicating malt liquors for medicinal purposes. The Act provided
"[t]hat only spirituous and vinous liquor may be prescribed for medicinal purposes, and
all permits to prescribe and prescriptions for any other liquor shall be void.', 162 The
challengers, a brewer and a bottler, lost their ability to sell malt liquor for medicinal
purposes following the Act; they contended the Act was not authorized by the
63
Eighteenth Amendment and ran afoul of "other provisions of the Constitution.",
Concluding that prohibiting the use ofthese medicinal agents was neither arbitrary nor
unreasonable, the Court focused on the legislative history of the Act. The House of
Representatives had held an extended public hearing and collected evidence to
evaluate whether intoxicating malt liquors possessed any significant medicinal
qualities.'64 Overwhelmingly, the evidence showed that intoxicating malt liquors had

157. Id. at 1215.
158. Id.at 1215-16.
159. Id. The court noted, in addition, that Congress was aware of discrepancies between the
legal and pharmacological classifications of cocaine at the time of the hearings preceding the
Act, but made the policy decision to retain cocaine's classification because of its established
capacity as a dangerous drug. Id. at 1216.
160. Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart I1), 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1636 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart
(Carhart1), 530 U.S. 914, 970 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
161. 265 U.S. 545 (1924).
162. Act Supplemental to the National Prohibition Act, 42 Stat. 222 (1921). This provision
banned beer, ale, porter, and other malt liquor containing one-half of one percent of alcohol by
volume and that was fit for beverage purposes. Everard's Breweries, 265 U.S. at 555 n. 1.
163. Everard'sBreweries, 265 U.S. at 556-57. Given the Court's analysis, it seems most
likely that the challengers also brought substantive due process or equal protection challenges.
Cf Peil Bros. v. Day, 278 F. 223,224 (D.N.Y. 1922) aff'd, 281 F. 1022 (2d Cir. 1922) (setting
forth liberty challenges to section two).
164. Everard'sBreweries, 265 U.S. at 561.
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no substantial value as medicinal agents. There was some difference of opinion, but the
Court brushed it aside as being debatable at the most. 165 In light of this evidence, the

Court concluded that it was reasonable for Congress to distinguish between spirituous
166
and vinous liquors and malt liquors "based upon their essential differences."'
Two years later, the Court rejected yet another Prohibition era challenge in Lambert
v. Yellowley. 167 This time, a physician challenged a portion of the National Prohibition
Act that limited the amount of spirituous liquor he could prescribe to a patient within a
ten-day period.168 The physician alleged that, in certain cases, a greater amount was
necessary for his patients' health, and that exercising his scientifically trained judgment
in the interest of his patients' well-being was an essential part of his constitutional
rights as a physician. 169 The Court summarily rejected this argument, explaining that in
light of the conflict in "[h]igh medical authority" as to the medicinal value of spirituous
and vinous liquors taken as a beverage, it would be strange if Congress lacked the
power to determine
that permissible prescriptions should be subject to some
70
limitations.

These cases share several attributes with Jacobson and the classification cases.171
First, they involved true scientific uncertainty, putting them in the non-binary,
qualitative realm. Second, the challenged statutes were within the heartland of police
powers and were reviewed deferentially. State statutes aimed at health and safety, like
the mandatory vaccinations in Jacobson,or at professional licensing, as in Collins, are
comfortably regarded as policy decisions wholly apart from any scientific avoidance
considerations. Likewise, although the Prohibition cases involved a unique
constitutional provision, the additional challenges to those statutes-grounded as they
were in the Fourteenth Amendment-reflected a similar attitude ofjudicial deference.
A litigant's scientific objection to a statute only highlighted the fact that the legislature
had made a policy choice in light of scientific uncertainty.
Science in these cases was presented as a basis for holding a statute arbitrary or
unreasonable. But in all cases where there was scientific uncertainty and the
legislature's choice was supported by at least some scientific possibility, the court
refused to side with science different than what the legislature used.
4. Shifting Signals
As I have noted, courts continue to confront science-based challenges to policepower statutes and classifications. The great majority of these cases fall, as did
Jacobson, within Quadrant I, with the courts concluding that the statute at issue
represents a rational legislative policy choice and that the scope of scientific
possibilities defines that spectrum of rationality. Although these cases arose in the early
twentieth century, their reasoning continues to be applied in police-power, social, and

165. Id. at 562.
166. Id.at 562-63. Presumably, there was a greater consensus in the medical community that
spirituous and vinous liquors had medicinal properties.
167. 272 U.S. 581 (1926).
168. Id. at 588.
169. Id.
170. Id.
at597.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 137-59.
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economic-regulation cases. If the use of scientific avoidance stopped there, it would be
entirely defensible. Not only were the scientific questions of a type better considered
by a legislative body from the standpoint of institutional competence, but their subject
matter and corresponding standards for review were well grounded in separation of
powers and state comity concerns. But sometime after the mid-twentieth century,
scientific avoidance began to creep into other areas of law. Along with this
development came a decline in scientific avoidance as a useful decision-making guide,
because it increasingly appeared as a rationalization rather than an independent
standard.
The first step in this shift seemed deceptively unremarkable; it involved a
classification for purposes of sentencing. But it was the first time the Supreme Court
had expressly spoken in scientific avoidance terms since the Prohibition era, and it
became a building block from which later cases of a different nature drew support.
Marshallv. UnitedStates172 involved a prisoner's equal protection and substantive due
process challenges to his exclusion from a drug treatment program on account of his
having three prior felony convictions. 173 The statute at issue, the Narcotic Addict
Rehabilitation Act (NARA) of 1966,174 provided for special rehabilitative treatment (as
opposed to traditional imprisonment) for certain addicts, but excluded from eligibility
offenders with two or more felony convictions. 175 Applying rational basis review, the
Court rejected the claim. 176 In a six-to-three opinion authored by Justice Burger, the
majority deferentially examined Congress's purposes in distinguishing between addicts
based on criminal history and concluded that Congress rationally decided to restrict
eligibility to those it viewed as most likely to respond to treatment. 77 Furthermore, the
Court emphasized that there was no consensus in the medical community as to the
nature of addiction or the efficacy of treatment methods. Thus, the NARA program was
"fundamentally experimental in nature."' 78 Congress might have permissibly set up
NARA differently, but different possibilities did not render the current scheme
unconstitutional. 179 The Court concluded with a statement of scientific avoidance:
"[w]hen Congress undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific
uncertainties, legislative options must
be especially broad and courts should be
80
cautious not to rewrite legislation."'

172. 414 U.S. 417 (1974).
173. Id. at 418-19.
174. Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-793, 80 Stat. 1438
(codified in scattered sections of 18, 28, & 42 U.S.C.).
175. Marshall, 414 U.S. at 418.
176. Id. at 423.
177. Id. at424-25.
178. Id. at426.
179. Id. at 427-28 (citing Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Williams v. Lee
Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)).
180. Id. at 427; see also Traynor v. Tumage, 485 U.S. 535,552 (1988) (upholding regulation
categorizing alcoholism as willful against Rehabilitation Act challenge stating: "This litigation
does not require the Court to decide whether alcoholism is a disease whose course its victims
cannot control. It is not our role to resolve this medical issue on which the authorities remain
sharply divided."); N.Y. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 590-92 (1979) (upholding
employer's policy of excluding therapeutic methadone users from employment, and reasoning
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The three-Justice dissent, led by Justice Marshall, disagreed with the way the
majority applied low-level scrutiny.18 ' According to Justice Marshall, the presumption
that two felonies indicated a nonamenability to rehabilitation was "plainly contrary to
fact."' 182 He cited evidence suggesting that some people with two or more felony
convictions were older, and older people often responded better to drug treatment
programs.18 3 To the majority's view that courts should be reluctant to interfere with
legislative decisions that were fundamentally experimental in nature, Justice Marshall
replied that that observation "must be tempered by a realization that we are
experimenting here with people's lives and health."' 184
That reply, of course, has been rejected time and again; in fact, some due process
challenges have expressly, and unsuccessfully, argued for a right not to be
experimented upon. 185 But previous cases, focused as they were on the state's ability to
legislate for the public health, implicated citizens' interests in bodily integrity that have
long been held subordinate to the overall public health, provided there was some
reasonable justification for the state's method of intrusion. The reason Marshallwas a
turning point is that it carried physical liberty overtones in ways distinct from
Jacobson-type facts: persons participating in the NARA program were eligible for
conditional release on parole following six months of treatment,
whereas those
86
offenders in the traditional system had no such opportunity.'
In spite of this distinction, Marshall is properly classified in Quadrant I. The
scientific knowledge about the nature of addiction and efficacy of treatment was
fundamentally qualitative and by no means binary, making the legislature the
institution with superior decision-making capacities regarding this issue. Furthermore,
the classification implicated no suspect classes or fundamental rights-a point that
even the dissent embraced-and so the scientific issue merely framed the bounds of
reasonableness. Thus, Marshall represented a most appropriate type of case for
applying scientific avoidance. Even so, its physical liberty implications represented a
shift that became manifest in the two Supreme Court cases that followed.
In the first, Jones v. United States,18 7 the petitioner challenged his ongoing
commitment to a mental institution. Charged with attempted petit larceny, a
misdemeanor punishable by a maximum sentence of one year, the petitioner was
diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia during his trial's pendency, and he entered a
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.188 Thereafter, he was committed to a mental
that more precise policies were not required given uncertainties associated with heroin addiction
and treatment, classification was rational).
181. Marshall, 414 U.S. at 431, 433 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Equal Protection
Clause has been all but emasculated .... If deferential scrutiny under the equal protection
guarantee is to mean more than total deference and no scrutiny, surely it must reach the statutory
exclusion involved in this case.").
182. Id. at436.
183. Id.
184. Id. at438.
185. This was a common theme in the fluoridation cases. See supra note 134; see also City
Comm'n of City of Fort Pierce v. State ex rel. Altenhoff, 143 So. 2d 879, 891 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1962) (rejecting contention that fluoridation unconstitutionally constitutes
experimentation); Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 127 N.E.2d 609, 613 (Ohio 1955) (same).
186. Marshall,414 U.S. at 438 n.1 I (Marshall, J., dissenting).
187. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
188. Id. at 359-60.
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institution pursuant to District of Columbia law. 8 9 After being hospitalized for a period
longer than he would have spent in prison under the petit larceny charge, he pursued a
claim that he should be either
released or recommitted pursuant to the District's civil90
commitment standards.
The standard for involuntary commitment requires a dual finding of dangerousness
and mental illness or abnormality reflecting a lack of volitional control. 191 Among
other things, the petitioner argued that the requisite dangerousness was not established
by his plea to a non-violent property crime. 192 And even if his crime could be
considered dangerous, he contended that available research did not reveal any
predictive value of this prior dangerous act.' 93 Congress failed to cite any empirical
evidence showing that a mentally ill person who had previously committed a criminal
act was likely to commit additional dangerous acts in the future. 194 Indeed, the
petitioner contended that the available research failed to support any such predictive

value.195
Justice Powell authored the five-to-four majority opinion rejecting the petitioner's
challenge. 196 In particular, the Court disavowed any need for the legislature to support
its approach with empirical evidence, stating, "[w]e do not agree with the suggestion
that Congress' power to legislate in this area depends on the research conducted by the
psychiatric community."' 97 In fact, the Court noted, "science has not reached finality of
judgment" on matters of mental health, and so the lesson the Court has drawn "is not
that government may not act in the face ofthis uncertainty, but rather
that courts should
98
pay particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments."
As in Marshall,most of the Jones dissenters particularly emphasized the scientific
uncertainty plaguing the legislative decision. The gist ofJustice Brennan's dissent went
to the standard applicable to the determination of future dangerousness. He argued that
both mental abnormality and future dangerousness required showings by clear and
convincing evidence. 99 The majority went off course, he argued, by linking a not
guilty by reason of insanity verdict to future dangerousness and obviating the need to
show future dangerousness separately by clear and convincing evidence. He contended

189. Id. at 360.
190. Id.
191. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,426-27,432-33 (1979); see Kansas v. Hendricks,
521 U.S. 346, 357-60 (1997) (elaborating on mental illness requirement); Jones v. United
States, 463 U.S. 354, 362 (1983) (describing standard as requiring demonstration, by clear and
convincing evidence, that individual is mentally ill and dangerous); see also infra text
accompanying notes 200-17 (describing Hendricks).
192. Jones, 463 U.S. at 364-65.
193. Id. at 364 n.13.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 364-65, 364 n.13.
196. Id. at 355.
197. Id. at364n.13.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 377 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall
and Blackmun. Id. at 371. In a short separate dissent, Justice Stevens emphasized his opinion
that if the petitioner was to be confined longer than he would have been incarcerated, the state
must bear the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the additional
confinement is warranted. Id. at 387 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 84:239

that this link was not scientifically substantiated; there were too many inaccuracies in
attempts to predict future dangerousness based on past actions. 200 Justice Brennan
concluded, "[t]he causal connection between mental condition and criminal behavior
is more a social
that 'not guilty by reason of insanity' formulations universally include
20 1
judgment than a sound basis for determining dangerousness."
Perhaps that very conclusion points to reasons for scientific avoidance. If scientific
uncertainty requires policy as a gap-filler, and social judgment is an expression of
policy, then the legislature ought to be better positioned than the judiciary to enact such
an expression. At the same time, Jones was a step removed from Marshallbecause it
squarely implicated physical liberty. That difference puts Jones in a different
Quadrant--Quadrant IV-because even if the scientific issue is better considered by
the legislature, the relevance of the science lies in its ability to justify taking away
physical liberty, an act that ought to receive less deferential treatment. Thus, pure
scientific avoidance of the Jacobson sort does not seem justified. And given these
considerations, it is hard to see how scientific avoidance actually advanced the
majority's analysis in Jones. Certainly the legislature was better situated to consider the
scientific uncertainties, but given the lack of supporting findings and the liberty interest
involved, Jones seems like an extension of scientific avoidance that undermines that
principle's very purpose.
The next case to spring from the Marshallline was Kansas v. Hendricks. 2 Again
in the realm of civil commitment, Hendricks was a repeat sexual offender whom
Kansas sought to commit pursuant to the state's Sexually Violent Predator Act.20 3 The
Act provided for civil commitment of any person who had been convicted of a sexually
violent offense and who suffered from a mental abnormality making the person likely
to engage in acts of predatory sexual violence. 204 "[M]ental abnormality," in turn, was
defined as a "congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional
capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree
constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others." 205 Hendricks
challenged the law on substantive due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto
grounds; the Court's substantive due process analysis touched on issues of scientific
avoidance.
The Kansas Supreme Court had been persuaded by Hendricks's due process claim
because it determined that U.S. Supreme Court precedent required a finding of mental
illness and dangerousness. 206 "Mental abnormality," the court had held, did not meet
the mental illness requirement in this context because even if Hendricks was mentally
abnormal, pedophilia did not qualify as mental illness. 20 7 On certiorari to the U.S.

Id. at 378-79.
Id. at 381.
521 U.S. 346 (1997).
Id. at 350.
204. KAN.STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to 59-29a22 (2005); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350-52.
205. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 352 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (2005)).
206. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 137 (Kan. 1996), rev'dsubnom. Kansas v. Hendricks,
521 U.S. 346 (1997); see e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363 (1983) (using term
"mental illness" with respect to meaning of verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity);
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (using term "mentally ill").
207. In reHendricks,912 P.2d at 138.
200.
201.
202.
203.
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Supreme Court, Hendricks likewise argued that the Court's precedent required mental
illness as a prerequisite to civil commitment, but a "mental abnormality" was
insufficient because it was a term coined by the Kansas legislature rather than the
psychiatric community. 2°8 In a five-to-four decision authored by Justice Thomas, the
Court explained that not only did prior authority fail to attribute any "talismanic
significance" to the words "mental illness," but psychiatrists themselves disagreed
regarding the meaning of mental illness. 209 And in any event, legal definitions need not
fit precisely with medical definitions because the law has different purposes in
recognizing mental illness than does the medical profession. 210 While the Court
recognized that psychiatric professionals disagreed whether pedophilia was a mental
illness, it viewed this fact as favorable to the Act: "it is precisely where such
disagreement exists
that legislatures have been afforded the widest latitude in drafting
' 211
such statutes.
212
Three of the four dissenting Justices agreed with the majority on this point.
Justice Breyer's reasoning was particularly instructive. He emphasized that the
psychiatric profession itself classified Hendricks's pedophilia as a serious mental
disorder. 213 While the profession debated whether the disorder should be considered a
"mental illness," Justice Breyer viewed the debate itself to be important because "[t]he
Constitution permits a State to follow one reasonable professional view, while rejecting
another., 214 The role of the psychiatric debate, therefore, was to "inform the law by
setting the bounds of what is reasonable, but it cannot here decide just how States must
write their laws within those bounds. 215
Like Jones and Marshall before it, Hendricks involved the interest in avoiding
physical restraint that is at the core of due process protection.21 6 Hendricks 's typology,
therefore, seems as though it should be distanced from the prototypical Quadrant I
cases exemplified by Jacobson v. Massachusetts. But what was the relevance of the
scientific uncertainty to the substantive standard? In other words, when the Court used
scientific avoidance terminology, to what, precisely, was it deferring? The answer is
that the Court gave deference to the state legislature's choice of requiring "mental
abnormality" rather than "mental illness"-a choice made in the face of conflict
amongst psychiatrists whether some abnormalities, such as pedophilia, qualified as
mental illnesses.21 7 Yet once the Hendricks Court clarified its civil commitment
standard to include mental abnormality, at least as applied to pedophilia, the scientific

208. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358-59.
209. Id.
at 359.
210. See id.
211. Id.at 360 n.3. Thus, the reasoning of the Hendricks Court is similar to that of the
classification cases. See supra text accompanying notes 138-59.
212. Justices Stevens and Souter joined Justice Breyer's dissent on this point; Justice
Ginsburg joined the remaining portions of the dissent, but she did not write separately
concerning the substantive due process claim. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373.
213. See id.
at 375 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
214. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 375 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
215. Id.
216. Id.at 356.
217. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 131-32 (Kan. 1996) (describing legislative history),
rev'd sub nom. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
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uncertainty became relevant, as Justice Breyer stated, only to the "bounds of what is
reasonable. 218
Furthermore, the scientific uncertainty was a qualitative, non-binary issue; the
classification of pedophilia as a mental illness as opposed to an abnormality involved
disputes in the field that centered on imperfect and evolving understandings of the
human brain. This was an as-applied challenge, so a binary question might have been
whether the petitioner's pedophilia constituted a mental abnormality. But in this case,
the abnormality question was not disputed.219 So Hendricks became a Quadrant I case
by virtue of its shift to reasonableness and the scientific uncertainty being qualitative
and non-binary. This shift within Hendricks itself echoes the shift that started with
Marshall, where scientific avoidance was applied to cases at least implicating
fundamental rights. With the cases that follow, the shift became complete, and with it
came an erosion of the reasons for using scientific avoidance in the first place.
5. Modem Erosion
The Supreme Court's most recent forays into scientific avoidance provide
underappreciated insights into how that principle should be applied. In 2000, the
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Stenberg v. Carhart(Carhartl)221striking down a
Nebraska law banning "partial birth abortion. 22' Seven years later, the Court upheld
the U.S. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003222 in Gonzales v. Carhart(Carhart
I/).223 CarhartII, in particular, demonstrates how-in a case now several generations
removed from the original Jacobson approach-the doctrine's usefulness has been
seriously eroded. Yet, as I argue in the next Part, that erosion reveals a unique
opportunity to reassess and redefine the parameters of scientific avoidance.
As noted already, CarhartI raised a challenge to Nebraska's partial birth abortion
ban. The challenge relied on two theories: first, the statute failed to provide an
exception for the preservation of the health of the mother; and second, it posed an
undue burden on a woman's ability to choose an abortion because its language
extended to the most commonly used mid-term abortion procedure. A fractured Court
struck down the statute on both grounds in an opinion written by Justice Breyer; I pay
particular attention to the first ground because it raised scientific avoidance issues.

218. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 375 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
219. Id. at 355 n.2 (majority opinion) (describing testimony regarding Hendricks's
diagnosis); see also In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 130-31. Nor did Hendricks dispute that he was
a pedophile. Id. at 143 (Larson, J., dissenting) (noting there was no objection to testimony that
Hendricks was a sexually violent predator as defined by the statute).
220. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
221. I use this term with some hesitation, knowing there is deep disagreement over its
meaning and proper usage. As described by the cases themselves, it is generally thought to
include the abortion procedures known as intact dilation and evacuation ("intact D&E"), and
dilation and extraction ("D&X"). See CarhartI, 530 U.S. at 928 (noting technical differences
but using terms interchangeably); id. at 999 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Legislatures, in fact,
sometimes use medical terms in ways that conflict with their clinical definitions, ... a practice
that is unremarkable so long as the legal term is adequately defined." (citation omitted)).
222. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
223. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
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The health-exception debate centered on whether there would ever be a need for the
partial-birth abortion procedure. Nebraska contended that the procedure was very
rarely used, and then by only a few doctors, and that two other methods not covered by
the ban were always safe alternative procedures.224 But the District Court found that the
banned procedure could significantly reduce health risks. 225 Further, the Court brushed
aside the argument that the procedure was used only rarely; "the health exception
question is whether protecting women's health requires an exception for those
infrequent occasions. 2 26 Simply put, in the presence of a medical debate as to whether
the procedure might sometimes be necessary for a22woman's
health, the majority held
7
that the Constitution required a health exception.
Justice Kennedy's dissent seized on the presence of a medical debate as a reason for
upholding the statute. 228 "Courts are ill-equipped," he wrote, "to evaluate the relative
worth of particular surgical procedures. The legislatures of the several States have
superior factfinding capabilities in this regard. 229 Citing Kansas v. Hendricks,23 °
Collins v. Texas,23' Lambert v. Yellowley, 232 and Marshall v. United States, 233 he
argued that there was substantial authority to support scientific avoidance even where
fundamental rights are at issue. 234 Indeed, he argued that this case was simply another
version of Jacobson, where there was no need for universal approval of a medical
approach before a legislature could pass laws on the particular topic.235 Curiously, the
other Justices-whether via the majority, concurring, or dissenting opinions--did not
address Justice Kennedy's argument. 2 36 But it proved an important foreshadowing of
CarhartII.

224. See id. at 931-33.
225. See id. at 932, 936.
226. Id. at 934.
227. Id. at 938.
228. See Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart 1), 530 U.S. 914, 972 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
229. Id. at 968 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
230. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
231. 223 U.S. 288 (1912).
232. 272 U.S. 581 (1926).
233. 414 U.S. 417 (1974). Justice Kennedy also included United States v. Rutherford,442
U.S. 544 (1979), in support of this proposition. Rutherford is inapposite because it involved
judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of its statutory mandate. Id. at 553-54 (affording
deference to Food and Drug Administration's interpretation regarding whether unapproved
drugs may be used by terminally ill patients).
234. CarhartI, 530 U.S. at 970 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
235. See id. at 971-72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
236. Justice Thomas came closest in his dissent, where he argued that the majority had
expanded the health exception jurisprudence by mandating the availability of a particular
procedure, rather than abortion generally. Under this approach, he argued, there could be no
regulation of abortion procedures because there would always be some support for any given
procedure. Id. at 1012 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In other words, because there is always the
potential for some scientific uncertainty as to medical procedures, Justice Thomas was
concerned that particular procedures could never be banned under the majority's approach.
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In CarhartII, the statute under attack was the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act of2003.237 The Act is unusual in its extensive legislative findings, beginning with:
"A moral, medical, and ethical consensus exists that the practice of performing a
partial-birth abortion . . . is a gruesome and inhumane procedure that is never
medically necessary and should be prohibited., 238 The findings recounted the Court's
decision in CarhartI, and asserted that Congress is not bound to accept the same
factual findings that the Supreme Court accepted in that case.239 Indeed, Congress
recited authority for the proposition that its findings were owed high deference by the
Court, and then detailed its findings that partial-birth abortion poses serious health
risks to women and is not accepted medical practice. 2 °
The attacks lodged against the Act were largely the same as in CarhartI: the
plaintiffs argued the Act once again failed to provide a health exception; it created a
substantial obstacle to women seeking abortions; and additionally, that it was void for
vagueness.241 This time, Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court. He
emphasized that the Act specifically responded to Carhart I; in addition to the
findings, the language differed in that it described the prohibited procedure in more
detail and required an overt act with scienter for criminal liability to attach.242 Indeed,
these features saved the statute from the vagueness and substantial-obstacle
challenges.243
The Court's treatment of the health exception argument built upon Justice
Kennedy's dissent from Carhart L The opinion began by describing evidence
presented at the trials below, which demonstrated that "[t]here is documented medical
disagreement whether the Act's prohibition would ever impose significant health risks
on women." 244 Then, again relying on cases such as Kansas v. Hendricks and
Jacobson, the majority cited the "traditional" rule that courts are to give "state and
federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical
and scientific uncertainty., 245 Then Justice Kennedy cited Hendricks for the
of legislative
proposition that "[m]edical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise 246
power in the abortion context any more than it does in other contexts."
Justice Kennedy contended that other considerations buttressed this conclusion.
Primarily, other alternatives were available to the prohibited procedure-at least one of
which had low complications rates and was commonly used.247 But how would the
Court reconcile the conclusion, based on evidence presented in the courts below, that
there was medical uncertainty as to whether the banned procedure might sometimes be
in the best interests of the woman's health, with Congress's finding that it was never

237. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
238. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-105, § 2(1), 117 Stat. 1201, 1201
(2003) (emphasis added).
239. See id. §§ 2(3)-(8).
240. See id. §§ 14(A)-(G).
241. See CarhartII, 127 S. Ct. at 1627.
242. See id. at 1628.
243. See id at 1627-35 (describing statute's features).
244. Id. at 1636.
245. Id.
246. Id.
at 1637.
247. Id.
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medically necessary? The Court declined to place dispositive weight on Congress's
findings, citing its "constitutional duty to review factual findings where constitutional
rights are at stake. 2 48 In fact, it stated flatly that "some of the recitations in the Act are
factually incorrect" 249 ; as a result, "[u]ncritical deference to Congress' factual findings
in these cases is inappropriate., 250 But the Court rejected the view that medical
uncertainty alone justified striking down a ban on a particular procedure-at least,
where there were other safe alternatives-because "[c]onsiderations ofmarginal safety,
competence when the
including the balance of risks, are within the legislative
' 25
regulation is rational and in pursuit of legitimate ends. '
Writing for the four-Justice dissent, Justice Ginsburg strongly criticized this
approach. She described in detail both the purpose of the Act-to nullify CarhartIand Congress's erroneous findings that the banned procedure was never medically
necessary. 252 By contrast, the district courts had held full trials where the parties were
able to present their best evidence. 253 In light of this evidence, the district courts
rejected Congress's findings and instead found that the banned procedure would in
some cases be the safest alternative for the woman's health. But the Court, Justice
Ginsburg argued, had failed to provide any reason for rejecting the findings of the
district courts; moreover, its assertion that medical uncertainty justified upholding the
had shifted its scrutiny
Act was "bewildering." 254 Indeed, she argued that the Court
25
from one of heightened review to review for rationality.
Both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Carhartllrevealimportant lessons
for scientific avoidance and help illuminate CarhartH's typology. A comparison with
Carhart I is also instructive. Under the standard described in CarhartI, the scientific
question was binary: was there a medical consensus that partial-birth abortion is never
medically necessary? If there was no such consensus, then for some women the banned
procedure would be necessary to protect their health, and the ban could not stand. The
scientific issue, therefore, was relevant not to a spectrum of reasonableness but to
whether, under a more heightened standard, the statute was constitutional at all. Thus,
CarhartI was a Quadrant III case.
CarhartH is in a different quadrant. The scientific issue was binary, just as it had
been in CarhartL But this time Congress had purported to provide an answer, and in
so doing provided a rare example of Congress getting positive science wrong. 256 Both
the majority and the dissenting Justices acknowledged the fallacy of Congress's finding
on this point,257 but Justice Ginsburg emphasized an observation important to scientific

248. Id.
at 1637-38.
249. Id.
250. Id.
at 1638.
251. Id.
at 1643-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
252. See id.
at 1644.
253. Id.
254. Id.
at 1646.
at 1650.
255. See id.
256. Cf.Wagner, supranote 17, at 199 ("[I]t appears that Congress may actually be doing a
good job at finding and using positive scientific knowledge when that knowledge is available.").
127 S. Ct. at 1637-38 ("[S]ome recitations in the Act are factually
257. See Carhart II,
incorrect."); id.at 1643 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Many of the Act's recitations are
incorrect.").
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avoidance more generally: because the district courts made findings following full
trials, they were able to consider much more extensive evidence concerning the safety
of the procedures than Congress had heard. 218 Importantly, the courts were not
attempting to decide the best procedure (an inquiry that would have been non-binary),
but merely to consider whether the banned procedure might sometimes be necessary.
This was a quantitative, binary question for which either the legislature or the judiciary
ought to be competent. Although Congress failed to reach the "right" answer with
respect to its findings, the judiciary was well within its bounds to consider evidence
and make a determination. This type of binary fact finding is the sort that courts engage
in all the time and are indeed well-suited to perform within the adversarial system.
The relevance of that scientific question to the legal issues, however, changed from
CarhartIto CarhartII. Under the CarhartIstandard, scientific uncertainty meant that
a health exception would be required to protect even a single woman for whom the
banned procedure might be necessary. But under the CarhartII standard, scientific
uncertainty meant that the legislature would have discretion in choosing to ban a
procedure where other procedures were available for women in the aggregate. In other
words, CarhartII changed the denominator for measuring an abortion statute's impact
on women's health-from one to all. In so doing, it shifted to a reasonableness
standard where the contours of scientific uncertainty merely outlined the spectrum of
what a legislature could enact. With this shift, CarhartII becomes a Quadrant II case
because it involves a binary scientific question whose relevance is in setting the
boundaries of reasonableness.
The puzzle of Carhart//-for scientific avoidance purposes-is the alarming hole
it leaves with respect to judicial review of legislative science. It seems to make
complete the subtle shifts begun with Marshall and leading to Hendricks, in the sense
that it is far less clear now than in, say, Jacobson,what the doctrine actually does to
further judicial review. And its classification in Quadrant II sets up a stubborn tension
in institutional competence because the courts are favored with respect to the science
issue, but the legislature is favored with respect to its relevance to the legal question.
Because Carhart II stands to undermine the goal of good science in our legal
institutions, Part II.B provides a means of deflecting that impact by offering a new
framework for scientific avoidance.
B. Reclaiming Scientific Avoidance-A ProposedFramework
Now that we have developed a typology and analyzed the key scientific avoidance
authority according to that typology, certain principles emerge that suggest a
framework for judicial review of legislative science. To summarize the previous Part,
Table 2 presents the typology:

258. CarhartI, 127 S. Ct. at 1644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Table 2. Scientific Avoidance Typology
Relevance of Question
Binary
Spectrum of Reason

Heightened Review

Type of Question
Non-Binay/Qualitative

Ouadrantll

OuadrantI

Carhart11

Jacobson
Collins
Aldrich Chemical
Marshall
Hendricks
ProhibitionCases

OuadrantIII

CuadrantIV

CarhartI

Jones

Scientific avoidance in Quadrant I makes sense from a comparative institutional
competence perspective. In that quadrant, the scientific issues are qualitative, nonbinary ones that legislatures are marginally better at considering. Admittedly,
legislatures do not always use the tools available to them for evaluating uncertain
science, but given the weaknesses of the courts in doing so, the legislatures'
capabilities are superior here. The specific contexts of the Quadrant I cases further
illustrate the point. The safety and effectiveness of vaccines, 259 the classifications of
professions 260 or chemicals, 261 the medicinal properties of alcohol, 262 the effectiveness
of substance abuse treatment, 263 and pedophilia as it relates to mental illness 264 are
issues on which there is no clear-cut scientific answer and on which numerous
scientific perspectives could be brought to bear.
Further, the scientific questions in Quadrant I are relevant only to the spectrum of
reasonableness from which a legislature may make a policy choice. This sort of
reasonableness, or rational-basis-type review, reflects the view that legislatures are
normally the better branch to make policy choices because they are politically
accountable. Indeed, this observation for scientific avoidance is consistent with the
rationales underpinning constitutional avoidance-that the "least dangerous branch"
should avoid invoking the Constitution, thereby meddling with265the politically
accountable branch, unless strong countervailing concerns justify it.
In stark contrast, scientific avoidance is not justifiable in Quadrant III. There, the
scientific issue is binary and is therefore no different than the types of questions courts

259. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
260. See Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288 (1912).
261. See Aldrich Chem. Co. v. United States, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 192 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981).
262. See Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581 (1926); Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S.
545 (1924).
263. See Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974).
264. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
265. See generally BICKEL, supra note 15.
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resolve all the time. 266 The adversary process of the court system is effective at
reaching binary decisions, whether as matters of fact or of law, and the scientific
question is really just a special type of factual question. Thus, the district courts in the
Carhart cases were fully capable of determining whether partial-birth abortion was
never medically necessary. As Justice Ginsburg described in her CarhartII dissent, the
courts were better situated than the legislatures because they were neutral fora and the
267
trial process incentivized the parties to present their very best evidence.
Furthermore, in Quadrant III the relevance of the scientific question goes to the
heart of higher-level scrutiny. In CarhartI for example, the science was outcomedeterminative under the standard the Court used to assess a woman's right to obtain an
abortion. One could also imagine a case involving, say, a race-based classification in
which a scientific issue related to how narrowly tailored the classification was to the
legislative objective. In such a case, the burden of scientific uncertainty would likely
fall on the defendant. That is to say, if a legislature were to actually get a binary
scientific issue wrong in such a case, that fact alone would be a strong reason to
suspect close or narrow tailoring had not been achieved. A court reviewing the
legislature from this perspective now has the strong countervailing considerations
justifying intervention that were lacking in Quadrant I.
Quadrants I and III therefore set the boundaries for scientific avoidance. In
Quadrant I, scientific avoidance makes sense and is advisable for reasons of
comparative institutional competence. By contrast, scientific avoidance in Quadrant III
probably amounts to an abdication ofjudicial responsibility. The other two quadrants
are more challenging to understand because each places the courts' and legislatures'
competencies in tension. Even so, each suggests potential applications in which either
axis would tilt in favor of, or away from, scientific avoidance.
Beginning with Quadrant II, how should a court respond when a legislature gets a
binary scientific question wrong? How should that information relate to the
reasonableness standard applicable to the legal issue? CarhartI1failed to answer these
questions; although it acknowledged the fallacy of Congress's findings, the Court
hedged its response. Essentially, it refused to give dispositive weight to the findings,
but it never addressed how those findings' errors should be accounted for as a matter of
constitutional review. It seems that, at the very least, such facts should raise a red flag
as to the possibility of irrationality. This assertion can be reconciled with Carhartllby
understanding that the fact that Congress was wrong was ultimately immaterial to the
standard is applied. To the CarhartII majority, what mattered was that there were
other safe options available-a "rational" conclusion reached by Congress. 26 But in
other scenarios, where the science truly is material to the reasonableness standard, an
incorrect binary scientific finding should be treated as a factor bearing on irrationality.
Finally, Quadrant IV involves the mirror-image tensions to those of Quadrant III.
Here the courts are not the preferable institution in terms of the scientific issues, but
they are tasked with conducting a more searching review as a result of heightened
scrutiny considerations. This quadrant is perhaps the most troublesome, as the courts
have profound institutional weaknesses in terms of gathering and assessing the relevant

266. See supra text accompanying note 90 (describing this superior institutional capability).
267. See Carhartl , 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1644-46 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 1638.
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science. 269 Two options seem possible here, each of which presents an opportunity for
further study. First, a court might consider whether, and the extent to which, a
legislature actually considered the scientific issue. While the court would certainly
have independent fact finding responsibilities with respect to constitutional facts, the
legislature's actualreliance on good science might have some bearing on fit between
the statute's means and ends. Second, a court might consider a "remand" to the
legislature for more particularized fact finding. 270 This approach would be consistent
with scientific avoidance principles because it recognizes the legislature's superior
abilities in this respect. But it would also safeguard important constitutional rights by
striking down the law at least temporarily, placing the burden of inertia on the
institution better equipped to consider the scientific matters bearing on constitutional
means-ends fit. Either way, the special capabilities of legislatures with respect to
science are entitled to consideration without abdicating the courts' roles in cases of
heightened scrutiny.
CONCLUSION

Recent cases invoking scientific avoidance have departed from the doctrine's
origins and have lost sight of the justifications underpinning its original form. This
trend risks clouded reasoning in the courts and disincentivizes legislatures from taking
full advantage of the many resources available to them for considering issues of
scientific uncertainty. By using insights regarding the nature of science to help identify
comparative institutional strengths and weaknesses with respect to science, we can
construct a means for evaluating prior applications of scientific avoidance as well as a
framework for its more principled future use.
While legislatures are ordinarily better equipped to consider broad questions of
scientific uncertainty, courts bring strengths with respect to binary decision making that
should be accounted for before applying scientific avoidance. Further, by overlaying
this binary/non-binary distinction over the scientific issue's relevance to a particular
standard of review, we can achieve a methodology that accounts for courts'
constitutional role in reviewing statutes as well as their institutional competence with
respect to science. This, in turn, can further the goals of improving scientific quality in
both courts and legislatures, making transparent the distinction between science and
policy.

269. See supra text accompanying notes 66-88 (describing weaknesses).
270. See Coenen, supra note 12, at 1755-72 (providing exhaustive description of such
"remands"); Mark V. Tushnet, LegalRealism, StructuralReview, andProphecy,8 U. DAYTON
L. REv. 809, 816 (1983) (describing this "structural review" as "paying attention to the
decisionmaker rather than to the decision").

